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
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**THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE IN
THE NICENE AND
ATHANASIAN CREEDS**



THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE IN
THE NICENE AND
ATHANASIAN CREEDS
A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL DEFINITION

BY

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University of the South*

καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK

LONDON, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA

1910

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Feb. 14, 1927

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PREFACE

THE following brief treatise is the outcome in part of studies pursued several years since for the degree of Doctor of Divinity in the General Theological Seminary, and in part of further investigation and reflection, together with eight years' experience in the instruction of students in theology and philosophy. It is, as its title indicates, frankly a study in theological definition. The writer is more and more convinced that if, on the one hand it is possible to exaggerate the importance of logic for the study of theology, it is quite as possible, on the other hand to undervalue its use and place. While the saying of St. Ambrose, "*Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum,*" must be allowed, it is at the same time no less true (if one may turn from Latin to Greek phraseology) that it is not in *κενολογία* or in *ἀτοπία*, — not through the violation of our logical thought-processes that it has pleased God to accomplish the work of man's redemption. If theology is to maintain its place among the sciences the use of the logical method must be conceded to her, and some place must even be allowed to what may in a broad sense be termed Scholasticism. The fact needs to be emphasized to-day that theology is not merely a descriptive and historical but a rational and intellectual science. It is true, moreover, that in its highest significance theology is more than even

an intellectual or a rational 'science;'—it is spiritual wisdom; it is truth for the spirit; not indeed for the world-spirit, but for that spirit which is "from God" (1 Cor. ii. 12). But here, as elsewhere, the spiritual is not the negation of the intellectual; for, while transcending, it yet includes the intellectual element.

The following pages are devoted to the study of the historic development of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The evolution of this doctrine is widely conceded to be the necessary presupposition of our modern conception of personality. The historic Creeds of the Church lay at the foundation of that intellectual training of Western Europe which was carried on from the period of the fall of the Roman Empire to the opening of the modern era. These Creeds therefore retain a deep and permanent significance not only for our spiritual but also for our mental life. It is with this conviction that the present treatise is offered, in the hope that it may prove a contribution, however slight, to the maintenance and advance of theological science.

WILLIAM S. BISHOP.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH,
Easter-Tide, 1910.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE
IN THE
NICENE AND ATHANASIAN CREEDS:
A STUDY IN
THEOLOGICAL DEFINITION

As a preliminary to the study of any doctrine set forth in the Church's Creeds, it becomes necessary to consider the relation of the Creed to Holy Scripture. Let it be stated at once that the relation of the Church's Creed to Holy Scripture is in a certain sense secondary and derivative. This does not mean that a Creed is a mere mosaic of Scripture texts. The dependence of which we speak is not a literary dependence, nor is it altogether a direct one; but such as it is it arises from the fact that while Holy Scripture, as the original (or the nearest that we have to the original) Record of Divine Revelation, has its source and its derivation from above, the Creed, as the official utterance of the Church, is manifestly of human origin in so far as the Church is a society of men, with all that that fact implies of dependence and of limitation. While saying this, at the same time we would not be understood by any means as denying or minimizing the divine constitution and character of the Church of God which is described by the Apostle Paul as "the pillar and ground of the

The Relation of the Creeds to Holy Scripture

truth." We do not, however, attribute to the Creeds inspiration in the same direct sense or with the same fulness of meaning in which we ascribe inspiration to Holy Scripture, which is "God's Word written" (Article XX of the Thirty-nine Articles). That this is at least the Anglican position is made evident by the following statements taken from the Articles of Religion: "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation" (Article VI). "The Nicene Creed and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed . . ." or, as the corresponding Article in the English Prayer Book reads, "The Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, —ought thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture" (Article VIII).

That is to say, the authority of Holy Scripture underlies the authority of the Creeds; the one is original, the other is derivative. Again, — "The Church hath . . . authority in controversies of Faith; and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore, although the Church be a witness and keeper of holy Writ, yet as it ought not to decree anything against the same, so besides the same ought

it not to enforce anything to be believed for necessity of salvation " (Article XX). Here the inner harmony and self-consistency of Holy Scripture is set forth as a test by which is to be judged whatever is taught in the Church. And as the Church thus defers to the authority of Holy Scripture, so the range and scope of the Church's doctrine is determined by the scope and range of that which is set forth in Holy Scripture. But this does not mean that the teaching (or doctrine) of the Church exactly corresponds in its form with the teaching of Holy Scripture. Between "Biblical" theology on the one hand, and "ecclesiastical" theology on the other, there is and there must necessarily exist a real distinction. The Church teaches by her Creeds, her catechisms, her doctrinal formularies; all of which are cast in a form suitable for didactic and pedagogic purposes, as well as for the purposes of missionary propaganda, but all differing essentially and, indeed, by necessity from that free, vital, fluent mode of presentation which is characteristic of Holy Scripture, and (we may add) of evangelical preaching. To the Church, as the great teaching institution, it has been left to determine the form in which she shall present to men, and shall present as her own testimony, that truth of Divine Revelation with which she has once for all been entrusted.¹

¹ To the statements quoted above may be added the equally explicit declaration of Article XXI of the English Prayer Book, entitled "Of the Authority of General Councils," which is as follows: "General Councils . . . (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed by the Spirit and Word of God)

It may fairly be said, therefore, that while Holy Scripture stands as the unique and original Record of divine Revelation, the function of the Creeds is interpretative, pedagogic, dogmatic. And this is confirmed by a consideration of the language of the Creeds themselves. For example, in regard to the Person of our Lord; while Holy Scripture sets forth to us His sacred Names and titles, — Son of God, Saviour, Christ, Lamb of God, Redeemer, — the effort made in the Creeds, particularly in those which are known as the ‘Nicene’ Creed and the *Quicunque Vult*, or so-called ‘Creed of St. Athanasius,’ is to interpret certain of these Divinely-revealed Names or titles of our Blessed Lord. The ‘leit-motif’ of the ‘Nicene’ Creed, for example, is the conception of Sonship, — the characteristic title under which our Saviour is presented is “Son of God.”¹ In the *Quicunque Vult*, on the other hand, . . . may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.” That the Protestant Episcopal Church is committed to this same position is evident from the fact that while (for certain reasons) the American Church omits the text of this Article from her Prayer Book, she nevertheless declares (in the Preface to the same Book) that “it is far from her intention to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of doctrine, discipline or worship, or further than local circumstances require.”

¹ This characteristic teaching of the ‘Nicene’ Creed is evidence of its close affiliation with the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel of our Lord’s Divine Sonship. It is a significant fact that the ‘three texts’ repeatedly urged by the great protagonist of the Nicene Faith against

the dominant conception is that our Saviour is 'Lord,' in the sense, that is, of 'Jehovah,' the Self-Existent One; that as the 'Lord,' moreover, He is on a plane of absolute equality with the Father (and with the Holy Ghost). The *Quicumque Vult* may accordingly be said to be the explication and enforcement of the truth set forth in the Apostolic declaration, — 'Jesus is Lord.'¹ Not only is it the fact, that the dominant conception or Scriptural 'leit-motif' of each of these two great Creeds is drawn from a particular section or division of the New Testament; it may further be said that each of these Creeds has its doctrinal 'matrix' in a certain New Testament formula.

In the case of the 'Nicene' Creed, this doctrinal matrix or normative passage is found in the Pauline statement in 1 Cor. viii. 6, — "To us there is one God, the Father, of (ἐκ, out of) whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (or by, διὰ) whom are all things, and we through (by) him." This passage of St. Paul is to be taken in connection with St. John's statement — "All things were made by (or through) him"² (i. e., the Logos, or Son of God). In order to illustrate this the better, a translation of the opening part of the 'Nicene' Creed is here given, the clauses

Scriptural
Affiliations
of the 'Ni-
cene'
Creed.

✓ the Arian heresy are all of them drawn from the Fourth Gospel; — St. John x. 30, 38; xiv. 9 — "I and the Father are one"; "The Father is in me, and I in him"; "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

¹ Rom. x. 9; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Phil. ii. 11; cp. also Acts viii. 16; xix. 5.

² St. John i. 3.

being so printed as to show more clearly the Scriptural affiliation to which we have referred :—

“I believe in ‘one God,’ the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible:

and in ‘one Lord,’ Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God;

begotten of the Father before all worlds (or ‘ages’);

‘God’ (out) of ‘God’;¹

‘Light’ (out) of ‘Light’;

very God (out) of very God;

‘begotten’, not ‘made’;

‘of one essence’ with the Father;

by (through) whom all things were made” (or, ‘came into existence’).²

¹ This phrase occurs in the original Symbol of A. D. 325, but is not found in the ‘Enlarged’ Creed which was officially recognized by the Council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451, and of which the Creed found in the Prayer Book is a translation.

² The following is the Greek text:—

Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεόν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων·

καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον, Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν Ὑῶν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ·

τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων,

[θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ,]

ὥς ἐκ φωτός,

θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ,

γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα,

ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί,

διὸ οὐ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο.

The above text is that given by Hahn in his *Bibliothek der Symbole*, pp. 162–165.

In the two normative and highly significant utterances (1 Cor. viii. 6 and St. John i. 3) the following salient points are to be noted, points which will be found to be characteristic of the Nicene orthodoxy;—(1) The Father is the 'one God'; i. e., the representative and guarantor of the Divine unity. (2) This God and Father is the one original source and cause of all things, *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα*. The Nicene theology understood (and still understands) the Divine Name 'Father' as connoting the one Source (*ἀρχή*) of all life, whether created or uncreated. "And even as there is (but) one source (or cause), so according to this (relation) there is (but) one God" *ὥσπερ δὲ μία ἀρχή, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἰς Θεός*.¹ (3) As the Father, the 'one God,' is the sole original source and cause of all things, so the 'one Lord,' Jesus Christ is the sole instrumental cause, 'through whom' are all things. This causality of Christ, the Son of God, moreover, is not merely 'instrumental' in a passive sense; for the Son is the Image and Likeness of the Father in His active efficiency. The Greek preposition (*διὰ*, followed by the genitive case) which is used both in 1 Cor. viii. 6 and in St. John i. 3, may be rendered by the English preposition 'by' (connoting active causal efficiency) quite as well as by the English preposition 'through' (which connotes instrumentality).² Now it is a note-

¹ St. Athanasius, Fourth Oration against the Arians, § i.

² In Rom. xi. 36 and Heb. ii. 10, e. g., *διὰ* with the genitive is used to indicate the creative activity of God the Father. In 1 Cor. viii. 6 the Revisers give the rendering 'through' in the text, and 'by' in the margin; while in St. John i. 3 they reverse this order, placing 'by' in the text and 'through' in the margin.

worthy fact that the 'Eastern' group of Creeds — all of which, broadly speaking, present a strong family likeness, — as they connect the phrases 'one God,' and 'of whom (are) all things' with the Person of the Father, so they connect the phrase 'through (or by) whom' (in the sense of instrumental causal efficiency), with the Person of the 'one Lord,' Jesus Christ.¹ In the 'Nicene' Creed itself, whether we take the original form of A. D. 325, or that later 'Enlarged' Creed of which the translation stands in the Prayer Book, we may understand the phrases which intervene between the Scriptural words, — "the only-begotten Son of God," and "by (through) whom all things were made," as parenthetical or explanatory. We refer to the well-known expressions, "begotten of the (his) Father before all worlds;" "God of (i. e., 'out of' or 'from') God"; "Light (out) of Light"; "very God (out) of very God;" "begotten, not made;" "of one essence (*ὁμοούσιον*) with the Father."

The above facts seem to indicate with sufficient clearness the close affiliation, not only of the 'Nicene' Creed, as it is commonly called, but of the whole Eastern group of Creeds, with the great normative texts, I Cor. viii. 6 and St. John i. 3.

We shall endeavor to analyze the Trinitarian teaching of the *Quicunque Vult* with the view of tracing, so far as we may, the affiliation of this formula to statements of the New Testament. The following is a translation of the Trin-

Scriptural
Affiliations
of the *Qui-
cunque
Vult*.

¹ See Appendix I. for citations from these Creeds.

itarian section of the *Quicumque Vult*; its clauses being printed so as to show more clearly the inner connection and development of the thought :—

“The Catholic Faith is this : that we worship ‘one God’ in Trinity, and the Trinity in the Unity; neither confounding the ‘Persons’ nor dividing the ‘Substance.’ For there is one ‘Person’ of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost; but of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost one is the divinity; equal (is) the glory; co-eternal (is) the majesty.

As (is) the Father, such (is) the Son, such also (is) the Holy Ghost.

Uncreated the Father; uncreated the Son; uncreated also the Holy Ghost.

Infinite the Father; infinite the Son; infinite also the Holy Ghost.

Eternal the Father; eternal the Son; eternal also the Holy Ghost.

And yet (there are) not three Eternals, but One Eternal; just as (there are) not three Uncreated nor three Infinites, but One Uncreated and One Infinite.

In like manner, Almighty (is) the Father; Almighty the Son; Almighty also the Holy Ghost; and yet (there are) not three Almighties, but One Almighty.

So also ‘God’ (is) the Father; ‘God’ (is) the Son; ‘God’ also (is) the Holy Ghost; and yet (there are) not ‘three Gods,’ but One is ‘God.’

So also 'Lord' (is) the Father; 'Lord' (is) the Son; 'Lord' also (is) the Holy Ghost; and yet (there are) not 'three Lords,' but One is 'Lord.'

Because just as we are compelled by the Christian truth to confess each 'Person' singly (as) both 'God' and 'Lord', so we are forbidden by the Catholic religion to say 'three Gods' or 'Lords.'

The Father is made from (by) none; neither created, nor begotten;

The Son is from (by) the Father alone; not made, not created, but begotten;

The Holy Ghost is from (by) the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.

There is one Father therefore, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.

And in this Trinity nothing is 'before' or 'after'; nothing is 'greater' or 'less'; but the entire three 'Persons' are co-eternal with Each Other, and co-equal.

So that in all things (as has already been said above) both the Unity in the Trinity and the Trinity in the Unity is to be worshipped." ¹

¹ The following is the text of the *Quicumque Vult* (see Hahn's *Bibliothek der Symbole*, p. 174),—

Fides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in trinitate, et trinitatem in unitate veneremur; neque confundentes personas, neque substantiam separantes. Alia est enim persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti; sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est divinitas, aequalis gloria, coaeterna majestas.

As for the Scriptural affiliation of the *Quicumque Vult*, we find on consideration that it is deeply rooted, on the one hand, in the Apostolic declaration "Jesus is Lord"; and on the other in the Baptismal formula set forth in St. Matthew xxviii. 19 — "Make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

As to the significance of the Divine title 'Lord'

Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.

Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus;
Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus;

Aeternus Pater, aeternus Filius, aeternus et Spiritus Sanctus.

Et tamen non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus; sicut non tres increati, nec tres immensi, sed unus increatus et unus immensus.

Similiter, Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus; et tamen non tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens.

Ita, Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus; et tamen non tres Dei, sed unus est Deus.

Ita, Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus et Spiritus Sanctus; et tamen non tres Domini, sed unus est Dominus.

Quia, sicut singillatim unamquamque personam et Deum et Dominum confiteri Christiana veritate compellimur, ita tres Deos aut Dominos dicere catholica religione prohibemur.

Pater a nullo est factus; nec creatus, nec genitus:

Filius a Patre solo est; non factus, non creatus, sed genitus:

Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio; non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens.

Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres; unus Filius, non tres Filii; unus Spiritus Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti.

Et in hac trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus; sed totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt, et coaequales.

Ita ut per omnia (sicut jam supra dictum est) et unitas in trinitate et trinitas in unitate veneranda sit.

(Κύριος) as applied to our Saviour in the New Testament, it must suffice for our present purpose to direct attention to the fact that this Name is identical with that which is used in the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament as the rendering of the Hebrew 'Adonai,' which, in its turn, represents the supreme Divine Name 'Jehovah.' The Divine Name Jehovah, as is generally acknowledged, indicated God as the Self-existent One, who revealed Himself to Moses as the I AM THAT I AM.¹ To acknowledge Jesus as 'Lord' meant for the consciousness of Christians in the Apostolic age the ascription to Him of Divine honour and worship, such as could lawfully be paid to Almighty God alone. Into the discussion of this subject we cannot enter here, inasmuch as the present work deals primarily not with Biblical exegesis, but with creed-interpretation. But it is only on the pre-supposition just stated that we can do justice, for example, to the language of St. Stephen at his martyrdom,² or to St. Paul's words in Romans x. 9-13.

In St. Matthew xxviii. 19 it is to be noted that the occurrence of the sacred appellations 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Holy Ghost' in the possessive case indicates that the Divine Name — by which the Jew would understand *per eminentiam* the Name Jehovah — is possessed or shared equally by the Three who are respectively denominated as 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Holy Ghost.' It is not simply that the Divine Name is

¹ Exod. iii. 14; vi. 3.

² Acts vii. 59, R. V., and see the Greek.

three-fold ; for "Jehovah is One, and His Name one,"¹ — but that whatever is connoted by the Name 'God' (Jehovah) is shared in and is possessed equally (for the Godhead is not subject to partition or division) by the 'Father,' by the 'Son' and by the 'Holy Ghost.'

Before we attempt to analyze the Trinitarian teaching of the *Quicunque Vult*, a few words may be permitted by way of comparison as between the 'Nicene' Creed and the *Quicunque*. The 'Nicene' Creed is the product of a theological development extending over several generations. As to its origin, it seems probable that it was derived, in part at least, from the local Creed of the Church at Jerusalem ; with the addition of certain phrases taken from other sources ; such as, for example, the characteristic Nicene doctrinal phrases, 'begotten, not made,' 'being of one essence (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father.' That is to say, this Creed, while in its final form ecumenical, represents an outgrowth from an original Baptismal Creed of an ancient and venerated Church.² The 'Apostles' Creed, as is well known, is representative of the group of Western Baptismal creeds : in all probability its origin is ultimately to be found in the ancient Creed of the Church at Rome. Moreover, it was not employed, as was the original formula of Nicæa (of 325 A. D.) as an ecumenical

¹ Zech. xiv. 9.

² For the history of the 'Nicene' Creed in respect to its documentary origin, see Dr. Hort's *Two Dissertations*, published in 1876 ; and compare a brief but careful review of the evidence in Bp. Gibson's *The Three Creeds*, pp. 169-174 (Note C., On the Origin of the Enlarged 'Nicene' Creed).

test of orthodoxy. But when we turn to the *Quicunque Vult*, we find in it not a Baptismal symbol at all, like the original Creeds (whether Eastern or Western), but rather a formula of doctrinal orthodoxy, divided into two chapters, of which the first deals with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; the second with the doctrine of the Incarnation.¹

The bond of union with Almighty God, as set forth in the *Quicunque Vult* is, in the first place, intellectual orthodoxy,² rather than the Divine Covenant established with us in Baptism. The 'one baptism for the remission of sins' is not mentioned in the *Quicunque Vult*, nor is 'the Holy Catholic Church; the communion of saints,' although of course these may be said to be necessarily implied.³ The *Quicunque Vult* in fact ushers in the age of dogmatic and militant Catholicism; it does not belong to the age of primitive

¹ It may have been for this reason (in part at least) that the *Quicunque* was not included by the American Episcopal Church in her enumeration of the Creeds.

² This is evident from the opening words of this formula, — "Who-soever willet to be saved, it is before all things necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith . . ."

³ It is also to be noted that the relation of the Divine Being to creation (i. e., to the created universe) is set forth in the *Quicunque Vult* from the negative rather than from the positive side. In distinction from the creature, the Divine Being is 'uncreated,' 'infinite' and 'eternal.' The positive relation in which Almighty God stands to the universe, as being its Creator, both in the sense of original Source and efficient Cause, is passed over entirely. In contrast to this, note the language of the Eastern (Greek) Creeds, quoted in Appendix I.

catholicity. Yet there is a majestic and awe-inspiring ring in the great clauses which ascribe to Each of the three Divine 'Persons' the attributes and titles of absolute Godhead. The *Quicumque Vult* may, indeed, be called the pæan of intellectual orthodoxy.

Let us now turn to the analysis of the Trinitarian conception as set forth in the *Quicumque Vult*.¹ In the first place, the supreme Name, which, as we have seen, is possessed by Each of the three Divine 'Persons,' connotes three distinct metaphysical or cosmical attributes; to wit, (a) *uncreatedness* (*increatedus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus*); (b) *infinity* or *incomprehensibility* (*immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus*); (c) *eternity* (*aeternus Pater, aeternus Filius, aeternus et Spiritus Sanctus*).²

After this group of three 'metaphysical' or 'cosmic' attributes follow three Divine titles drawn from Revelation, by the introduction of which the mind is lifted from the plane of metaphysical thought to the plane of spiritual faith. The Divine style and title 'Lord God Almighty,' found in the Apocalypse, is here resolved into its component parts, and each of these parts is attributed to Each of the holy Three.

¹ The analysis which here follows is a preliminary one; the same ground (in part) is covered in what is said below, pp. 36-41, on the Western (Augustinian) conception of the Holy Trinity.

² The use of the conjunction *et* to introduce the Name of the Third Divine 'Person' seems to indicate the fact that with the complete development concerning the Godhead and personality of the Holy Spirit the Trinitarian dogma was rounded into its final form.

The Father is 'God,' the Son is 'God,' and the Holy Ghost is 'God;' yet not 'three Gods' (even as not three Infinites or three Eternals, or three Uncreated Ones), but there is one God. In like manner the Divine title 'Lord' (as equivalent to 'God') is dealt with, and so likewise is the title 'Almighty.' Thus reason and Revelation concur in the explication of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

Up to this point, however, we have been contemplating the Divine Three with reference to that which They possess in common, by virtue of Their sharing, Each and All, in the possession of the Divine and ineffable Name. In other words, our thought has been dealing with what theologians would describe as the 'conferentia' of the Holy Three. By Their joint possession of these Divine attributes, by Their joint sharing in these Divine titles, They are not distinguished *in concreto*; in other words, so far as has yet been seen, there might be three 'Fathers,' or three 'Sons,' or three 'Holy Ghosts'; which would certainly not correspond to the Scriptural representation of the Holy Trinity. In order, then, that the Trinitarian statement may be made complete, it is necessary that to the mention of the Divine 'conferentia' (the so-called 'absolute' Divine attributes or titles) the mention of the Divine 'differentia' be added. These are the so-called 'relative' Divine attributes of 'inderivation'¹ (if we may use this term for lack of a better), of

¹ 'Inderivation' is, in itself, not properly a term of relation; it is rather the negation of a relation: yet for this very reason it is par-

'filiation' and of 'procession.' These three terms respectively express the peculiar characteristic content of the three Divine Names 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Holy Ghost.' It is the 'proprietas' of the Father to be 'un-derived'; it is the 'proprietas' of the Son to be 'begotten'; it is the 'proprietas' of the Holy Spirit to 'proceed.' Thus the white light of colorless 'trinity' (to borrow the term used by Professor William Newton Clarke) takes on the varied hues of those concrete personal distinctions which exist in what we may perhaps reverently speak of as the Divine Family.¹

We have now, so to speak, descended from the plane of the absolute to the plane of the relative; from the sphere of 'Deity' to that of 'Divinity.' But in so doing, we have not left the region either of eternity or of essential and supreme equality: for "in this Trinity there is no 'before' or 'after,' no 'greater' or 'less'; but the entire three 'Persons' are co-eternal with each other and co-equal." Whereas, in the 'Nicene' Creed relativity is apparently applied to the conception of Godhead, by the phrases, 'God (out) of God,' 'Light (out) of Light' (almost as though the Son were a sec-

allel to the other two terms which express 'relative' Divine attributes.

¹ " Within the deep and luminous subsistence
Of the High Light appeared to me three circles,
Of threefold colour and of one dimension;
And by the second seemed the first reflected
As Iris is by Iris, and the third
Seemed fire that equally from both is breathed."

Dante, *Paradiso* XXXIII, 115-120. Longfellow's translation.

ond 'Light' or a second 'God'), in the *Quicumque Vult* this relativity is restricted to those terms 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Spirit,' which in themselves not only imply but clearly express mutual relation.

The question now being agitated in England as to the use of the 'Athanasian' Creed in the services of the Church is directing men's thoughts afresh to the consideration of this ancient Symbol.

The Need of Applying the Analytical Method to the Interpretation of the Creeds.

There have been discussions and resolutions both in the Convocations of Canterbury and of York, and the columns of English Church newspapers have teemed with correspondence bearing upon the subject. Moreover, several important books have recently appeared, such as Bishop Gibson's "The Three Creeds," and Dr. Illingworth's "The Doctrine of the Trinity." But in all the recent discussion or even in the theological literature that has appeared of late there has been but little evidence of the fruits which should result from a fresh and modern application to the Creeds of the method of logical analysis. There have been speeches, review articles, letters and books dealing with what may be called the external relations of the Creeds in general, and of the 'Athanasian' Creed in particular; but there has been comparatively little fresh and fruitful study, from the Church point of view, of the inner doctrinal content of these great historic documents and standards of the Faith.¹ Failure to apply the analytical method of

¹ Since the above was written, Dr. Sanday's valuable work entitled *Christologies, Ancient and Modern* (Oxford University Press, 1910),

study to such documents as these must necessarily result in serious hindrance to the proper application of the historical method. In fact, the two methods, the logical or analytical and the historical, necessarily act and react, the one upon the other; each without the other must remain incomplete, and must fail, moreover, in attaining results which shall be both fruitful and reliable. If symbolic statements which belong to different ages, and have taken shape in diverse environments are not carefully and critically studied both in their fundamental doctrinal characters and as to their form of expression, we shall be at a loss how to assign to them their proper places in the course of doctrinal development. At the same time, if the fact of historical evolution be not fully and clearly recognized, we shall not be able adequately to understand the Creeds.

What is greatly needed at the present time is the application to the Catholic Creeds of a sober and intelligent historical criticism, such as is proving so helpful in the field of Biblical study to-day. Thus we may be saved from committing that peculiar sin against history which consists in reading back into the documents or the formulas of an earlier period ideas or conceptions which properly belong to a later has appeared; the first two sections of which deal with the Christology of the ancient Church. This latest book, like Dr. Sanday's work in general, affords an example of that fresh and fruitful historical study which is the outcome at once of wide and accurate scholarship and of the ripest culture. A. E. Burn's learned *Introduction to the Creeds* (Methuen and Co., London, 1899), also deserves mention.

one. But if this be the peculiar transgression which violates the true historical method, it is at the same time to be borne in mind that this very fact implies that due weight is to be given to formal or logical considerations, as well as to those which are specifically 'historical.' For chronological sequence is not the only kind of sequence; there is a sequence of thought which is independent of time; and of this fact historical students need sometimes to be reminded. <The evolution of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is one of the greatest and most complex movements in the history of human thought; it was a movement logical as well as historical; to its interpretation, therefore, we must apply philosophical as well as purely historical methods and canons. It is a violation of the historical method when the Creeds are looked upon as it were in bulk; without due regard being paid to the successive steps by which the dogma of the Trinity came gradually to be defined. One of the chief offenders in this regard, we may say at once, was Cardinal Newman; and that despite the fact that Newman was one of the first to attempt a scientific application of the principle of development to the study of Church doctrines and institutions. But it is evident to the careful student of Newman's learned Notes upon the anti-Arian treatises of St. Athanasius that he reads back into the Nicene doctrine the conceptions of the later Augustinian and Scholastic theology, and in consequence gives a thoroughly unhistorical interpretation

The Historical Method of Interpreting the Nicene Creed violated by Newman.

of the 'homoöusion.' This point will be more fully developed in what is to be said later on; it has been noted by a recent American scholar, Professor L. L. Paine, in an acute though ultra-critical study of the Nicene theology of the Trinity in its relation to the Trinitarianism of St. Augustine.¹ Meanwhile we may remark that Newman's failure to apprehend the distinction which exists in the Greek mind and from the Greek point of view between *ὁμοιος* and *ὁμος* is sufficiently evidenced by the following statement taken from his "Grammar of Assent."² "Each thing has its own nature and its own history. When the nature and the history of many things are similar we say that they have the same nature; *but there is no such thing as one and the same nature* (italics are ours): they are each of them itself, not identical but like." To Newman, however, the term *ὁμοούσιος* as it occurs in the Nicene Creed means something quite different from what it meant to the Greek orthodox fathers of the fourth century. Newman's offense, we may remark, is at once against the historical method and the method of logical analysis, and is but another illustration of the intimate relation which subsists between the two methods of inquiry, and of the impossibility of really separating them the one from the other.

But a later offender in this particular instance is one

¹ *The Evolution of Trinitarianism*, by L. L. Paine; Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Boston, 1900.

² In the chapter on Inference, p. 280 of the edition of 1874, Burns and Oates, London.

who stands theologically at the antipodes to Cardinal Newman; greater than Newman as a historian, though not to be ranked with Newman as a philosophic theologian. We refer to the distinguished historian and critic, Dr. Adolf Harnack. Harnack (who here follows the lead of Zahn) falls into the same error as does Newman in failing to understand the *ὁμοούσιον*. Construing it as he does in the sense of strict numerical identity, Harnack thereby introduces into the Nicene formula a contradiction; upon the ground of which contradiction he then proceeds to condemn the 'homoeousian' teaching of the Nicene Creed as illogical, and indeed irrational. Both Newman and Harnack are agreed in recognizing in the Creed not only that which *transcends*, but that which *contradicts*, human reason.¹ But while Harnack

¹ The following quotations will make this apparent, so far as Newman is concerned; though we must admit that Newman's language is not always consistent with itself.¹ In Note (d) to § 25 of the treatise "On the Nicene Definition," Newman expressly denies that the words we use concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity are self-contradictory. In Note (c) to § 28 of the Third Oration against the Arians, he says that the Catholic doctrine involves "an incongruity in the ideas which it introduces." In Note (g) to § 33 of the Second Oration against the Arians, Newman makes a statement as to the relation in which the Second Person in the Holy Trinity stands to the First Person. He admits that this statement is "not only a contradiction in the terms used, but in our ideas, yet not therefore a con-

¹ Our references are to the Oxford edition of 1844 (The Library of the Fathers) published by John Henry Parker. Newman's Translations and his Notes upon St. Athanasius are reproduced, with some significant modifications and omissions, in the series known as The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, being vol. iv. of the Second Series, edited by Dr. Robertson, the present Bishop of Exeter.

would expose what he believes to be the contradiction only for the purpose of rejecting it, Newman devoutly

tradition in fact." In Note (x) to § 2 of the Fourth Oration against the Arians, Newman says, — "The Mystery of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity is not merely a verbal contradiction, but an incompatibility in the human ideas conveyed by them (i. e., by the words used). *We can scarcely make a nearer approach to an exact enunciation of it than to say that one thing is two things.*" (Italics are ours.) This last Note, we may remark, is omitted in Bp. Robertson's edition. A sentence is also omitted from Note (c), § 28, Orat. III. (from which we have already quoted) which is not only theologically significant, but interesting as illustrating the subtlety of Newman's mind. Newman goes on to qualify the statement he had just made as to the "incongruity of ideas introduced" in the statement of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, as follows, — "Not indeed ideas directly and wholly contradictory of each other, as 'circulus quadratus,' but such as are partially or indirectly antagonist, as, perhaps, 'montes sine valle.' "

As for Dr. Harnack, his position is defined with greater sharpness albeit with less subtlety than in the case of Newman in the following sentences, — "Unquestionably the old Logos doctrine . . . strike(s) us to-day as being full of contradictions, but it was Athanasius who first arrived at the *contradictio in adjecto* in the full sense of the phrase . . . Whatever involves a complete contradiction cannot be correct, and every one is justified in unsparingly describing the contradiction as such. This the Arians sufficiently did, and in so far as they assumed that a contradiction cannot be seriously accepted by any one, and that therefore the view of Athanasius must at bottom be Sabellian, they were right. Two generations and more had to pass before the Church could accustom itself to recognize in the complete contradiction the sacred privilege of revelation."¹

Again, — "It was no longer possible to avoid the *vis inertiae* of the gnosis of Origen, the contrary formulæ which were held together by the idea of the Logos-cosmology as the basis for Christology. And now the question was which of the two was to be adopted,

¹ *History of Dogma*, vol. iv., pp. 46, 47.

embraces the contradiction, in the spirit of Tertullian's "Credo quia impossibile."

The Creeds, we may here remark, are often misunderstood in either one of two ways. One is when they are regarded as merely human products, which have been fashioned by men out of the stuff of their own thoughts and speculations, without any special guidance or inspiration of the Divine Spirit. On this purely rationalistic basis the Creeds may be expected to contain, as according to Dr. Harnack they do contain, human errors and contradictions. On the other hand, the Creeds are misunderstood when they are regarded as mystical statements of that which tran-
the *Logos-κρίσιμα* or the *Logos-δημοσίως* formula. The former freed from the latter was indeed deprived of all soteriological content, but was capable of intelligent and philosophical treatment — namely, rational-logical treatment; the latter, taken exclusively, even supposing that the distinction between the Son and the Father, and the superiority of the Father were maintained in connection with it, simply led to an absurdity. Athanasius put up with this absurdity. . . ." And in a footnote here subjoined Harnack's anti-dogmatic animus leads him to make still more extreme, we may even say violent, statements. — "The Nicene Creed sanctioned it" (i. e., the contradiction). "One of its most serious consequences was that from this time onward Dogmatics were forever separated from clear thinking and defensible conceptions, and got accustomed to what was anti-rational. The anti-rational — not indeed at once, but soon enough — came to be considered as the characteristic of the sacred. As there was everywhere a desire for mysteries, the doctrine seemed to be the true mystery, just because it was the opposite of the clear in the sphere of the profane. . . . The complete contradiction involved in the '*Ομοούσιος*' drew a whole host of contradictions after it, the further thought advanced."¹

¹ Ibid., p. 49.

scends human thought, as though they were not expected to be altogether intelligible. But the latter idea, whether consciously or unconsciously held, in reality plays into the hands of the enemies of the truth. In itself unsound, it rests upon a serious misconception. Though the Divine Reality itself does indeed transcend human thought, as it does our human experience, yet at the same time the statement of our human thought about the Divine Reality, if it is to be commended to men for their acceptance, must at least conform to the canons of human reason, just as it must conform to the tests of historical truth and actuality. And human reason, as reason, does not and cannot contradict itself. It is to be regretted that the scholarly Bishop of Exeter should (in his Prolegomena to the writings of St. Athanasius¹) seem to allow that human thinking can tolerate explicit contradictions. Such an admission seems to us in the highest degree unscientific. We must contend not only that theology is a science, but that theologians no more than other men of science can claim any dispensation from the laws of reason and logic. If, e. g., there are real contradictions in the Nicene Creed, as Harnack maintains there are, then the truth of the Creed is to that extent invalidated. But we are persuaded that the appearance of contradiction in the Nicene Creed is the result of a superficial

Our Interpretation of the Nicene Creed must not transgress the Canons of Logic.

¹ Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers; Second Series, vol. iv., p. xxxiii.

study, not of a thorough investigation of that Creed, whether in itself or in its relation to Greek theology. Or perhaps more accurately, it is the result of a confusion of two lines of thought which are historically and doctrinally distinct, though (owing to various causes) somewhat difficult to disentangle. These lines of thought or doctrinal 'tropi' ¹ (if we may venture upon this application of a term used, though not in precisely the same connection, in the Greek theology) may be designated as respectively the Nicene (or Origenistic) and the later Western or Augustinian.² A clear understanding of these distinct lines of thought is absolutely necessary if we are to gain any real conception of the process of development in the statement of Trinitarian doctrine. If there is no distinction between the Nicene and the Augustinian conception of the Trinity, there is no room for the process of evolution as from the one to the other; if on the other hand the two conceptions are contradictory, or are even inconsistent with each other, evolution as a normal process is invalidated. The reason why Harnack finds a contradiction in the 'homoöusion,' we are persuaded, is (as we have said) that he fails to understand it, and that for the same reason as

¹ The Greek *τρόπος* = method, manner, character; the root-meaning coming from *τρέπω* = I turn : as we say 'turn of mind'; a 'turn' for study; a mechanical or a practical 'turn.'

² The line of Trinitarian exposition to be found in such earlier Western writers as Tertullian and Novatian is doctrinally allied rather to the later Nicene orthodoxy than to the Trinitarianism of St. Augustine.

does Newman; namely, because he reads it in the light of the later Augustinian and Western theology. Harnack, like Newman, understands the 'unity of essence' predicated by the 'homoöusion' in the sense of a strict numerical unity or identity. Consequently, he understands, or rather misunderstands the 'homoöusion' in a Sabellian sense. Let it be remarked, however, that this does not by any means imply that St. Augustine was a Sabellian. The so-called 'Athanasian' Creed, which is the distinctive expression of Augustinian Trinitarianism, rejects Sabellianism at the outset in the most explicit terms:—"Not confusing the 'Persons' . . . for there is one 'Person' of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost." But Augustine's line of defence against Sabellianism is not to be confused with that of Athanasius and of the 'Cappadocian' theologians—Basil and the two Gregories. This statement is here made by way of anticipation; it will be justified, as we venture to think, in the light of what is to follow. What we wish to emphasize at this point, and as strongly as possible, is the fact that the Trinitarianism of Origen, Athanasius and of the Nicene Creed in its Eastern form (i. e., without the 'Filioque' clause) is, as a doctrinal 'tropus' or line of thought, relatively yet clearly distinct from the Trinitarianism of Augustine and of the *Quicumque Vult*. It is owing to this fact, which is so often lost sight of, that the Nicene Creed is sometimes understood to contain logical contradictions. The misunderstanding arises from confusing

two distinct lines of thought; from failing to distinguish between two separate strata of theological doctrine. There is no contradiction between the Trinitarian thought of St. Augustine and that of St. Athanasius: not because their Trinitarian teaching is precisely identical, but because the two theologies (though closely related) move upon distinct planes, and for this very reason do not clash with each other. The evidence in support of this statement will appear, it is hoped, in the remaining part of this discussion. Very much to the purpose is the fact, to which Harnack calls attention, that "Augustine's acquaintance with the Cappadocian theology was of a very superficial kind. . . . In his discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity Augustine seldom expressly falls back on the formulæ of the Nicene Creed. . . . The Nicene Creed is not once mentioned in the work *De Trinitate*." ¹ We may add that neither does the 'homoöusion' occur in the *Symbolum Quicunque*; a fact surely not without significance as bearing upon the meaning of the 'homoöusion.' Certainly we ought at the present stage of scientific *Dogmengeschichte* to have advanced beyond the ancient error into which uncritical writers of (what may be called) the 'ante-evolutionary' period may be pardoned for having fallen; the error of attempting to read back into Nicene symbolic statements the distinctive conceptions of Western Scholasticism. It is true that one important circumstance has unfortunately always

¹ *History of Doctrine*, vol. iv., pp. 131, 132.

thrown a colour of plausibility over such a procedure, thoroughly unhistorical as the procedure itself is. The use of the term 'Athanasian' to designate a Creed which did not emanate from the East at all, and which is not in historical dependence upon the school of Origen (of which Athanasius as well as Arius was a product), is, of course, thoroughly misleading. But this designation of a Western and Augustinian Creed by the name of the great Bishop of Alexandria, the protagonist of the Nicene faith, has been sanctioned by the usage of so many generations that it is likely still to persist, despite its absolute 'unhistoricity.' Yet scholars, at least, ought not to allow themselves to be even unconsciously biased by an error which has so long since been plainly exposed. One finds here, however, but another illustration of the power which current expressions and popular phrases retain, even when these are not in accordance with acknowledged facts.

It remains for us to attempt as briefly as we may an analysis of the Nicene Trinitarian conception, and also to restate the (relatively distinct) conception which emanated from the school of St. Augustine, and to observe how these two conceptions stand related to each other. We shall then, perhaps, be in a position to estimate in what sense and to what extent the transition from the Eastern doctrinal 'tropus' to that of St. Augustine and of the Schoolmen was a process of evolution. In this transition the 'Filioque' clause will of course be found to play the principal part. The question accordingly

**The Nicene
Trinitarian
Conception
Analyzed.**

will call for consideration, To what extent, if at all, was the introduction of the 'Filioque' clause into the Creed a matter of logical and legitimate development? And this latter question, again, will have to be considered from the stand-point both of the Eastern and of the later Western theology. With the ecclesiastical and political bearings of the controversy over the 'Filioque' clause we are not here directly concerned; just as we are not immediately concerned with the present agitation in the Church of England touching the 'damnatory' clauses of the 'Athanasian' Creed, or the requirement that it be publicly recited in Divine worship.

What we have ventured to call the Nicene doctrinal 'tropus' is not to be absolutely identified with the individual views of Athanasius, of Basil, or of any one Greek Father or theologian, as expressed at some particular moment in the long and often confused conflict with Arianism, which extended over a large part of the fourth century.¹ We take as our guide and standard of reference the original Nicene formula of A. D. 325, and also the enlarged Creed of which the Creed in the Prayer Book Office of Holy Communion is a translation. This Creed, having taken shape by a process which we are not yet able to trace with absolute certainty, at any rate came in the fifth century to be adopted as the Ecumenical and official formulary of the Church, both Eastern and Western. We take

¹ See Appendix II., which deals with the Trinitarian terminology of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century.

this Creed, moreover, in its Greek form, i. e., without the 'Filioque' clause. Let us attempt, then, briefly to set forth the Nicene Trinitarian conception in its salient features. (a) The guarantee of the Divine unity is found in the Person of the Father, who is the 'One God' (*εἰς θεός*).¹ (b) The Son is from (*ἐκ*) the 'substance' or 'essence' (*οὐσία*) of the Father; eternally begotten: and therefore the Son also is 'God' (*θεός*). (c) No distinction is drawn between 'substance' or 'essence,' and 'person' (*οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*); these terms are treated as synonymous in the anathema which follows the Creed of A. D. 325.² (d) The Son is *ὁμοούσιος* with the Father, which means that the very same *definition* of Godhead which is applicable to the Father is applicable also to the Son.³ For, as

¹ This point has already been mentioned. See p. 7 above.

² This title, however, is given to the Son attributively rather than substantively or subjectively. The Father is *ὁ θεός*, 'God,' i. e., primarily and *per eminentiam*.

³ Of course we do not forget that this distinction was later drawn by the 'Cappadocian' theologians, and so passed into the Greek theology; yet it seems never to have been drawn with the same clearness and sharpness which in the West characterized the distinction between 'substantia' and 'persona,' and which is emphasized in the *Symbolum Quicumque*. How could it be? since the *one* Divine *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* was frequently identified with the Person of the Father, who is the *Μονός* and *Ἀρχή*. Compare, for example, the following statement of St. Athanasius, in the opening section of his Fourth Oration against the Arians; — "Ὡς περὶ δὲ μία ἀρχή, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, εἰς θεός. Ὅντως ἡ τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ ὅντως οὐσα οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις μία ἐστίν, ἡ λέγουσα, Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν, καὶ οὐ δύο, ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρχαί, κ. τ. λ.

⁴ Cp. St. Basil, Ep. xxxviii. 2. — "Those who are described by

St. Athanasius says,¹ "There is but one kind (or species) of Divinity, which is also in the Logos" *ἐν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ*. But this unity of nature does not exclude a certain subordination of the Son to the Father; in fact, both the unity of nature and the subordination in dignity are based upon the same fact of the Divine generation of the Son from the personal Being of the Father.

(e) In considering the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as this is set forth in the 'Enlarged' Nicene Creed, it will be convenient to have before us the clauses in which this doctrine is stated. Our translation follows the Greek text as closely as possible.

The Teaching of the 'Nicene' Creed as to the Holy Spirit.

the same definition of 'essence' are homoousioi" *καὶ εἰς ἀλλήλους ὁμοούσιοι οἱ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπογραφόμενοι*. Aristotle in his chapter on Unity (Metaphysics, Book IV. ch. 6), after distinguishing 'unity in respect to essence' (*ἐν καθ' αὐτό*) from accidental unity, proceeds further to distinguish three different senses of 'unity in respect to essence,' as follows; — (a) continuity (*τὸ συνεχές*) which seems to carry with it the idea of physical oneness, as that of the hand with the body; (b) generic or specific unity; and (c) unity in respect to definition, to which corresponds unity of conception in the mind which frames or apprehends the definition. It is unity in this third sense which is the key to the meaning of *ὁμοούσιος* as used by the Greek orthodox Fathers. Not that the unity between the Son and the Father is conceived by them as a mere abstraction, however; it represents the *θεότης* or Divine Nature which, as St. Athanasius says, is *ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰς τὸν Υἱόν*. St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration XXX. 20) suggests the comparison of the relation sustained by the Son of God to the Father with that between the 'definition' and the 'thing defined.' See also Orat. XXXVIII. 13, where the Son is called the Father's *ὅρος καὶ λόγος*.

¹ Orat. III. contr. Arian. § 15.

“And we believe in the Spirit
the Holy,
the Sovereign,
and the Life-creating;
the (One) proceeding from (out of) the
Father,
the (One) with Father and Son together
worshipped and together glorified,
the (One) who spoke through the prophets.”¹

The following points are of especial importance: The personality and Deity of the Holy Ghost are clearly indicated by the terms used. The Divine Spirit (τὸ Πνεῦμα) is described by seven adjectives and participles (compare the ‘seven Spirits’ of God in Revelation i. 4, iv. 5, v. 6). He is the ‘Holy’ τὸ Ἅγιον, the ‘Sovereign’ τὸ Κύριον, and the ‘Life-creating’ τὸ ζωοποιόν; the (One) ‘proceeding’ from (or out of) the Father τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον; the (One) with Father and Son ‘together worshipped’ and ‘together glorified’ τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Ὑψὶ συνεκπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον; the (One) who ‘spoke’ through the prophets τὸ λαλήσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν. The adjective Κύριον

¹ The Greek text as given by Hahn (*op. cit.*, pp. 164, 165) is as follows:—

Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα
τὸ Ἅγιον,
τὸ Κύριον,
καὶ τὸ ζωοποιόν.
τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον,
τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Ὑψὶ συνεκπροσκυνούμενον
καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον,
τὸ λαλήσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.

from the noun *Κύριος*¹ indicates the Godhead of the Spirit; *ἄγιον* and *ζωοποιόν* His absolute holiness and His creative or life-giving activity; *ἐκπορευόμενον* His essential relation to God the Father; while His Divine personality is clearly shown by the three participles 'worshipped' and 'glorified' together with Father and Son, and that 'spoke' through (or by) the prophets. Though the Spirit is said to proceed 'from' (*ἐκ*) the 'Father,' and is not said to proceed 'from' (*ἐκ*) the 'Son'; yet from another point of view the Spirit's relation to the Son is set forth in a way analogous to that in which is expressed the relation of the Son to the Father. For as the Son is *θεός*, while the Father is *ὁ θεός* (*εἰς θεός*), so the Spirit is *τὸ Κύριον* — a descriptive adjective — while the Son is called *ὁ Κύριος* (*εἰς Κύριος*), a personal title.² Thus the unity of the 'one God' is preserved inviolate, while the Godhead of the Son is also asserted; and in the same way, while the Son is acknowledged as the 'one Lord,' this does not exclude the 'Sovereign Spirit' (*τὸ Κύριον Πνεῦμα*) from being also Divine.

The Trinitarian conception of the Nicene Creed may be set forth in tabulated form as follows: —

The Father = *ὁ θεός, εἰς θεός.*

The Son = *θεός, ὁ Κύριος, εἰς Κύριος.*

The Spirit = *τὸ Κύριον.*

¹ *Κύριος* both in the Old and New Testaments represents the Divine Name 'Jehovah.'

² The Prayer Book translation of the 'Nicene' Creed, it is hardly necessary to say, fails to bring out this distinction.

In the above scheme there is evidenced a careful avoidance of contradiction, whether in word or in thought. For (and this is the main point at issue), the term *ὁμοούσιος* does not connote the strict numerical identity of the Son with the Father. Athanasius in his brief but weighty Statement of Faith or 'Ecthe-sis,' while affirming the *ὁμοούσιος*, expressly and emphatically rejects the phrase *μονοούσιος*, by which, he says, the 'heretics' (Sabellians) "destroy the existence of the Son" (*ἀναιροῦντες τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ*). We cannot at all agree with Bishop Robertson that the distinction here indicated by St. Athanasius between *μονοούσιος* and *ὁμοούσιος* is "without real meaning."¹ From the point of view of Greek theology, which is the only point of view from which to estimate it, this distinction is of the utmost importance. To the mind of the orthodox East this distinction is the Church's safeguard against Sabellianism, doing the same duty which in the West is done in a different way by the phrase *tres personae*. The relation between Father and Son in the Godhead, as conceived by the Nicene orthodoxy, is analogous to, albeit not strictly parallel with the *specific* oneness which exists between the human child and its parent; it is based upon the fact of generation. The unity of the Godhead, both specific and numerical, is guaranteed by the *ὁμοούσιος* taken in conjunction with the fact that the Father is the 'one

¹ Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers (Second Series), vol. iv., p. xxxii.

God'; there are not two Gods, because there are not two ἀρχαί.¹

So much for the Nicene conception of the Holy Trinity and of the relation of the Son of God to the Father. We now turn once more, and at the risk of some repetition, to the distinctive conception set forth in the *Quicumque Vult*. And here at the outset it is important to note a fact frequently overlooked; the fact, namely, that in the Trinitarian portion of this Symbol (verses 3 to 26, inclusive) two sections are to be distinguished. The first section, dealing with the 'absolute' attributes and Names of the Godhead, — which Names or attributes are said to belong to Each of the three 'Persons' singly — includes verses 3 to 19, its teaching being summed up in verse 19; — "For, just as we are compelled by the Christian verity to confess each 'Person' singly as 'God' and 'Lord,' so we are forbidden by the Catholic religion to say 'three Gods' or 'Lords.'" It is important to bear in mind the fact that it is in this first section that the *distinctive* Trinitarian doctrine of the Symbol is set forth. The Second and Third 'Persons,' like the First, are 'uncreated,' 'infinite,' and 'eternal.' They, even as the First 'Person,' and in exactly the same sense, are said to be 'Omnipotent,' 'God' and 'Lord.' These are the specific attributes and the distinctive Names which belong to the Godhead, and which are incommunicable to any creature. By their possession of

¹ St. Athanasius, Orat. IV. contr. Arian. § 1 (already quoted).

these, They are One:— not 'three Gods' or 'three Eternals,' but 'One Eternal' and 'One God.' This first section of the Symbol, therefore, views the Divine Trinity from the standpoint of the absolute. While the three 'Persons' are distinguished by the Names 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Holy Ghost,' the characteristics of the Divine Three, as They are related to Each Other, are not as yet explained. But in the second section (verses 20 to 23, inclusive) this explanation is given by reference to the previous Nicene doctrinal formulæ (with the addition in verse 22 of *et Filio*, which corresponds to the 'Filioque' clause) — "The Father is made 'from' (by) none; neither 'created' nor 'begotten': the Son is from (by) the Father alone; not 'made,' nor 'created,' but 'begotten': the Holy Ghost is from (by) the Father *and the Son*; not 'made,' nor 'created,' nor 'begotten,' but 'proceeding.'"¹ The teaching of this section, setting forth as it does the relative characteristics or attributes of the Divine 'Persons,' interposes not only a nominal, but a real and concrete barrier against the conception that there might be 'three Fathers' or 'three Sons' or 'three Holy Ghosts.' And then the Creed, returning from the standpoint of relativity to the standpoint of absoluteness, sweeps away all idea of subordination or real priority in the Holy Trinity by the summary statement which follows (in verse 24), — "And in this Trinity there is no 'before' or 'after,' no

¹ On the preposition ('a') here translated 'from' or 'by,' compare pp. 44, 45.

'greater' or 'less,' but the whole three 'Persons' are co-eternal with Each Other and co-equal."

By its adoption of the Nicene conceptions of 'generation' and 'procession,' supplemented by the 'Filioque' statement, the *Quicumque Vult* relates itself integrally to the previous doctrinal development; while by its own distinctive teaching it has advanced beyond the previous Nicene stage.

The Nicene and Augustinian Trinitarian Conceptions compared.

This is in accordance with the general law of evolution, whereby the later and more highly-developed form takes up into itself and assimilates that which belongs to the previous stage of development. In the light of this fact, we must recognize in the *Symbolum Quicumque* the most comprehensive statement of Trinitarian doctrine which is to be found among the formulas of the Church. Inferior to the Nicene Creed in point of ecumenical authority, the *Quicumque Vult* surpasses the Nicene Creed in scientific comprehensiveness. It is for this reason that the *Quicumque* has remained to the Western mind for so many centuries as the classical expression and safeguard of the great doctrine of the Trinity. And in spite of all that is alleged about the difficulty, or even the unintelligibility of this Creed, its distinctive teaching is probably, after all, closer and more familiar to us, is more readily assimilated by minds trained to blunt and practical Western ways of thinking than are the subtle distinctions of Greek theology. The Western mind knows nothing of 'grades' of Godhead. To its view, Christ is either

God, in the absolute sense, or He is not God. The Latin, like the later Western languages, knows nothing of the distinction between *θεός* and *ὁ θεός*. It is impossible for the type of mind represented by the writer of the *Symbolum Quicunque* to rest in the thought of a merely relative Godhead as belonging to the Son or to the Holy Spirit. From the Augustinian point of view, the bond of the Divine Unity is not found in the Person of the Father, but rather in 'Jehovah,' the Self-existent One,¹ who exists in Each and All of the three Divine 'Persons.' It is here that the conception of strict numerical unity, which is wrongly located by Harnack and Newman in the *ὁμοούσιον*, has its rightful place; inasmuch as Jehovah is absolutely and utterly One (not *unum*, but *Unus*). The distinctive Trinitarian teaching of the *Quicunque* is, after all, surprisingly simple. It may be said to be summed up by the statement that Each of the three Divine 'Persons' — the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost — is absolutely and unqualifiedly 'God'; and yet that there are not 'three Gods' but 'One God.' The difficulty arises from the fact that this distinctive teaching is linked on to the (relatively distinct) Nicene doctrinal statement. The two doctrinal 'tropi' are relatively distinct from each other, inasmuch as each has its own point of departure, from which it moves logically over its own lines. The two systems, though closely related to each other, do not conflict. The starting-point of the Nicene Creed is in the 'One

¹ See Appendix III., on St. Augustine's Trinitarian teaching.

God' as identified with the Person of the Father; from this point it proceeds logically by virtue of the principles of 'eternal generation' and of 'procession.' The starting-point of the *Quicunque Vult* is in the 'One God' as identified with Jehovah, the Self-Existent One; taken in connection with the further fact that this Supreme Name is rightly attributed to Him who is called the 'Son' and to Him who is called the 'Holy Spirit,' as well as to Him who is called the 'Father.'

It is not meant, of course, by what has just been said to assert that the conception of the Divine self-existence was peculiar to Latin theology; for this idea was always explicitly understood as being conveyed by the very Name of 'God.' But in the Greek theology this Name is primarily associated with the Person of the Father. An early example of the association of the Divine Name with the three 'Persons' of the Trinity equally, and (as we may say) 'indifferently,' in a Western symbol, is in the Confession of Faith set forth by the first Council of Toledo, held about A. D. 400; — "Credimus in unum Deum; Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum . . . hunc unum Deum et hanc unam esse divinae substantiae Trinitatem" . . . (in this Confession occurs the phrase, — "Spiritum . . . a Patre Filioque procedens").¹ The great contribution of Augustinianism to the theology of the Trinity was the clear distinction which it introduced between the conception of the Divine 'Persons' and the con-

¹ Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole*, pp. 209-210.

ception of 'God.' In the Nicene theology the term 'God' sometimes approaches a generic and indefinite conception; it connotes what is called in the language of Aristotelian philosophy a *δέντρα οὐσία*.¹ Moreover, it must be borne in mind that in the Western theology the conception of the Divine 'Substance,' distinguished as it is from the Divine 'Persons,' yet connotes individual being; it is not the impersonal 'substance' of Pantheism, but it indicates the 'One God' of Christian faith. "Three 'Persons' in one 'Substance,'" which occurs in the Preface for Trinity Sunday, is equivalent to the "three 'Persons' and One 'God'" of the Litany.²

To sum up: the Augustinian conception is distinctively static and logical, while the Nicene conception is evolutionary and genetic. The Augustinian conception dwells in the region of absolute being, far removed from those ideas of time and change and limitation from which the Nicene orthodoxy had such constant difficulty in guarding itself.

Relativity is involved, indeed, in the very concep-

¹ See St. Gregory of Nyssa, "De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostaseon," ed. Morell, Paris, 1638, p. 29, c. d., quoted below, p. 73.

² It might conduce to clearness of exposition if we could indicate graphically the distinction between the Nicene and the Augustinian doctrines by printing their respective characteristic formulae in differently coloured inks; following the suggestion given by certain anatomical charts, in which different sets of nerves or blood-vessels are distinguished by being depicted in different colours. For our purpose in the present connection, the Nicene characteristic formulae might be printed in *red*; while those of the school of St. Augustine might appear in *blue*.

tion of the *ὁμοούσιον*, which is perhaps the reason why the use of this term (or rather its Latin equivalent 'con-substantial') was avoided in the *Symbolum Quicunque*. In order that one thing may be said to be *ὁμοούσιον* with another, the two must be compared.¹ Thus, 'the same' may be said to involve 'the like'; and 'likeness' again implies a relative 'unlikeness.' The terms expressing these several conceptions (*ὁμοούσιος*, *ὅμοιος*, *ἀνόμοιος*) accordingly became watchwords in the theological controversies of the fourth century. What enabled the *ὁμοούσιος* finally to triumph was the implicit belief of the Church that her Lord is indeed God, not only in name but in fact. No lower term than *ὁμοούσιος* was adequate to express this belief.

It now remains to consider the position and meaning of the 'Filioque' clause, and how it stands related to the Nicene orthodoxy on the one hand and to the Western Trinitarianism on the other. We shall thus perhaps be enabled to determine in what sense and to what extent the passage from the Nicene to the Augustinian position was in the nature of an evolution. To Western Christendom the 'Filioque' clause was a bridge thrown over the interval which separated the Nicene theology of the *Τριάς* from the Augustinian theology of the 'Trinitas.' The Greeks declined to cross this

¹ In the words of St. Basil (Ep. lii. 3)—"For nothing is *ὁμοούσιον* with itself, but one thing (is so) with another" οὐ γὰρ αὐτό τι ἑστίν ἐαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. See Appendix II. (p. 67), *infra*.

bridge. Were they logical in doing so? From their standpoint there is reason to think that they were; inasmuch as the Father is, according to Nicene theology, the one ἀρχή in the Godhead. Nor could the expression “(the Holy Ghost) proceeds from the Father *through* the Son” prove a satisfactory compromise; for what the Greeks objected to was the Latin preposition ‘ex’ in this connection, which they recognized as denoting not *instrumentality* but *origin*. From the Greek point of view this implied that the Son was a second ἀρχή in the Godhead, thus destroying the μοναρχία of the Father. To the Latins, on the other hand, God, the Self-Existent Being, is the one ‘principium.’ Is the Son God? This is the real question. If the Son is God, then the Spirit of God is *His* Spirit, — proceeds from Him. The Son is the ‘principium’ of the Spirit, however, not as He is Son but as He is God (non quâ Filius, sed quâ Deus). This is a most important distinction, inasmuch as it guards against the thought of there being two ‘principia’¹ or ἀρχαί in the Godhead. Once more, it is important to apprehend that it is not as God that the Spirit ‘proceeds,’ but as Spirit² (non quâ Deus, sed quâ Spiritus);

¹ . . . “fatendum est Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus Sancti; non duo principia: sed sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus, et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum Sanctum unum principium.” St. Augustine, *De Trin.* V. 15.

² “Sed tamen ille Spiritus Sanctus . . . in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, relative dicitur; cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur, quia Spiritus Sanctus et Patris et Filii Spiritus est.” *Ibid.*, V. 12.

✓ for while 'procession' is not necessary to the idea of God as such, it is of the very nature of Spirit to 'proceed.'

The Nicene Creed, held with the 'Filioque' clause, and apart from the *Symbolum Quicumque*, is like a bridge springing from one side of a ravine, which should rest upon no corresponding support on the other side. From the scientific point of view the phrase could in that case be regarded only as a fragment, as superfluous to the earlier statement upon which (to change the simile) it was grafted. It is only when the doctrine of the *Quicumque* is taken into view that the real significance as well as the logical necessity of the 'Filioque' clause becomes apparent. In this connection, it is an interesting as well as a significant fact that the language of the *Quicumque Vult* does not necessarily raise the question involved in the 'Filioque' clause. The Greeks objected to the preposition ἐκ, which indicates 'source' or 'origin,' as expressing the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son. It was the Latin preposition 'ex' (which has the same meaning as the corresponding Greek ἐκ) that was used in the Latin version of the enlarged 'Nicene' Creed. It is to be noted, however, that in the *Quicumque*, while 'ex' is employed to set forth the relation of the Son to the Father in verse 29 (i. e., in that section of the *Quicumque* which relates to the doctrine of the Incarnation), in the Trinitarian section another preposition ('a' or 'ab') takes its place, as indicating not only the relation of the Second 'Person' to the

First, but also as indicating the relation of the Third 'Person' to the First and to the Second. Now the Latin preposition 'a' or 'ab,' while it *may* indicate 'source' or 'origin,' does not necessarily or invariably do so. It corresponds not only to the Greek ἀκ, but in some connections to ἀπό, in others to παρά, which indicate respectively motion 'away from,' and 'from a position of proximity to.' It is a highly significant fact that in the Vulgate text of St. John xv. 26 the Greek παρά is twice rendered by the Latin 'a';—"Cum autem venerit Paracletus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit." . . . All therefore that the language of the *Quicumque Vult necessarily* expresses is a more general relation of the Holy Spirit to the First and to the Second Divine 'Persons'; and the statement of the *Quicumque* is in perfect accord with the fact that God the Father is the one original Source (ἀρχή) of the Holy Ghost.¹

From the Nicene to the Augustinian Trinitarianism a process of logical evolution may be traced, in virtue of the fact that the fundamental principle of the Augustinian doctrinal 'tropus' was in reality implicit in the Nicene theology. It was there beneath the surface, gradually working towards its full and complete expression. But may we not say that from the nature of the case,—from the strength as well as from the

¹ The difference between 'ab' and 'ex' is illustrated by Cicero (Caecin. 30, 87) as follows;—"Si qui mihi praesto fuerit cum armatis hominibus, extra meum fundum, et me introire prohibuerit, non *ex* eo, sed *ab* eo loco me dejecerit."

limitations of the Nicene doctrinal scheme, it was impossible that this development should take place upon the soil of the Eastern Churches. It was only in the West, and under the forms of a different language, that this evolution could work itself out.

But in a more restricted sense the passage from the Nicene to the Augustinian dogma was not in the nature of an evolution, inasmuch as a formula can 'evolve' only that which is already implicitly contained in it. The Augustinian 'theologoumenon' or doctrinal 'germ' (if we may be permitted the use of a biological term in this connection) was, as

we have seen, a different germ from that which gave rise to the Nicene development. The Nicene germ is the conception of Divine 'generation,' which virtually means 'evolution.' But Jehovah is not 'generated,' for He is the Self-Existent One. The Second 'Person' in the Holy Trinity is 'God,' not primarily because, as 'Son,' He is 'generated,' but simply for the reason that according to the "Christian verity and the Catholic religion" the supreme Name is attributed to Him. If then the Son is rightly called God, it must be because He is God; for Jehovah, "whose Name is Jealous," "will not give His glory to another."¹ This is what may be termed the 'Jehovah-doctrine' of the *Symbolum Quicunque*. If the Nicene 'hypostases' may be said to correspond to the plurality indicated by the Divine Name Elohim, the 'Unus Deus' of the

How far can
the Principle of Evo-
lution be
Applied to
the Inter-
pretation of
the Trinita-
rian Doc-
trine?

¹ Exod. xxxiv. 14, Isa. xlii. 8, xlviii. 11.

Quicumque Vult represents Jehovah, "who is One and his Name One."¹ As the Nicene doctrinal germ is the (evolutionary) conception of Divine generation, so the Augustinian germ is the conception of the Divine absoluteness.² Both of these germs had existed from the beginning in the mind of the Christian Church, but they did not come to fruition at the same time or in the same place. The doctrinal 'tropus' of the Nicene Creed is in accordance with the inductive method of thinking, the point of departure of which lies in the concrete, and which seeks beneath the phenomenal to find the essential. In the present connection, as between the two relatively distinct 'Beings,' God and Christ, Nicene thought discovers the inner bond of connection and of identity in the Divine Nature (*θεότης*) which is common to Both. It is this inductive character of Nicene theology which so strongly commends it to men's minds in this present age, devoted as it is to the scientific investigation of Nature and of history.

On the other hand, the mode of thought which is illustrated in the *Quicumque Vult* is the method of deductive logic. Affirmation is balanced by negation; analysis is conjoined with synthesis; abstract conception alternates with concrete individual fact. First comes the introductory and general statement of the complex conception in the clauses, — "The Catholic Faith is this: that we worship 'one God' in Trinity, and the Trinity in the Unity; neither confounding

¹ Zech. xiv. 9.

² Cp. Appendix III. (pp. 84, 85).

the 'Persons,' nor dividing the 'Substance.' For there is one 'Person' of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost; but of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost one is the divinity, equal (is) the glory; co-eternal (is) the majesty." Then, as we have already seen, follow the terse statements, linked in triple succession, each of them setting forth a single concrete fact, such as, "The Father is uncreated;" "The Son is God;" "The Holy Ghost is Almighty." ¹ Here the identity between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is construed as the individual unity of the one Jehovah, Who is uncreate, infinite, eternal; Who is the Almighty God and Lord. With the attainment of this stage of thought, scientific Trinitarian theology reaches its final completion. The result of our investigation may therefore be stated as follows;—The *Quicunque Vult* is a product of theological evolution in a wide sense, although it cannot in strictness be said to have been 'evolved' from any previous symbolic formula.

By its logical method and its strict scientific form, taken in connection with the fact of its origin in the school of St. Augustine, this Creed impressed itself most strongly upon the mind of Western Europe from the beginning of the Mediæval period, and without doubt played an important part in furthering the de-

¹ To this combination of abstract general statement with concrete individual fact in the *Quicunque Vult* Newman has called attention in penetrating and eloquent language; see his "Grammar of Assent," pp. 124-137.

velopment of Scholasticism. The *Quicumque Vult* must ever be recognized as one of the mile-stones in the advance of human thought. May it not be of especial value to us at the present time, when we are perhaps in danger of laying too exclusive stress in our thought and culture upon genetic and evolutionary considerations, and too little upon those which are strictly and severely logical? For if the Nicene Creed may be called the Creed of relativity and of evolution, the *Quicumque Vult* may with equal propriety be termed the Creed of the absolute and of logic.

The two categories of Being and of Becoming (*εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*), which Greek philosophy always kept distinct, we at the present time are in no little danger of confusing. This is due in part to the influence of Hegelian metaphysics, in part to the recent rapid rise and at present almost overwhelming influence of the scientific conception of evolution. Now if the Nicene Creed lays special emphasis upon eternal Becoming (or Generation) the Athanasian Creed chiefly emphasizes the eternal Being of God; the characteristic conception of the latter Creed is that of a 'static' Trinity, while the former presents to us a Trinity which is both energized and energizing. We have already called attention to the remarkable fact¹ that the Athanasian Creed makes no explicit mention of creation, though this is of course implied in what is said of God as the 'Uncreated.' In the Nicene Creed, on the other hand, it is by the eternal Son

¹ See above, page 14, foot-note 3.

that all things are said to have been 'made' (God the Father being understood as the Original Cause); while the creation of life is especially attributed to the Spirit, 'the Sovereign and Life-creating' (τὸ Κύριον καὶ ζωοποιόν). In our thought of the Triune God we need to combine the antithetic elements of necessity and of freedom, of rest and of movement, of absoluteness and of eternal relation. It is to these complementary and mutually balancing truths that the two great Creeds which we have been considering bear their united and indispensable witness.

Any study of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity would be incomplete which should fail to take into consideration the fact that the conception of the Trinity which is most real and vital to Christian men to-day is not the metaphysical conception, whether in its Nicene or Augustinian form, but that which may be called, in distinction from these, the spiritual or experimental conception. The presupposition for the Christian interpretation of the Holy Trinity is obviously Christian faith, which has embraced the great facts of the Incarnation of the Son of God, and of the sending forth of the Holy Spirit as the Divine-human Principle of life from the Risen and glorified Saviour. It is that faith which has brought us into vital union with the Risen Lord, in the sphere of that same Divine-human life. For the Spirit of God has now, in and through the Risen Christ, and by our union with Him, become the spirit of man. In view of this great and all-transform-

**The Trinity
as Inter-
preted in
Christian
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ence.**

ing fact, the Trinity is now seen in a new light ; not the light of mere human reason, but the light of spiritual illumination. It is in the spirit alone that we find ourselves within the sphere of the Divine Trinity ; it is in the spirit alone that we recognize in God our Father, in Christ Jesus our Divine-human Lord, in the Holy Ghost our own deepest Life. From this standpoint of the 'new creation in Christ Jesus,' the Holy Trinity is seen not in mere external fashion, as abstractly Divine and transcendent, but as including a human element, as having entered into and as existing in the sphere of human relations. For our life is within the sphere of that Divine-human kingdom of God whose law and controlling principle is "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship (or communion) of the Holy Ghost." The Divine Fatherhood is in relation to men, as new-created in Christ. Christ Himself, the Risen Lord, is the God-man ; not abstract God or simple Man, but God and Man brought into the unity of one glorious Person. The Holy Spirit is Christ's Spirit, and is therefore recognized as the personal Principle of this Divine-human life. In this interpretation of the Trinity both 'Christology' and 'anthropology' are laid under tribute, and that a fuller and a richer anthropology and Christology than were at the command of the Church at the period of the great general Councils. This Trinity (if we may so say) has its point of departure in time though essentially transcending all limits of time. But the spiritual Life of which we

speak was not realized until Jesus had been glorified;¹ it is 'from' the beginning, rather than 'in' the beginning. (Compare I St. John i. 1; ii. 7, 13, 14, with St. John i. 1.) The Spirit is now the bond of union not only as between the 'Persons' of a transcendent Godhead, but in Christ Jesus and through Christ as between God and man. The Risen Christ, the 'second Man,' the 'Man from heaven' is literally the 'beginning,' the starting-point of the new creation of God. Into this divine Kingdom men can be brought, of it they can become a constituent and integral part. Of this Kingdom the 'momenta' or constituent elements, so to speak, may be indicated (according to the point of view) as God, Man and Christ; as the Father, the Lord and the Church; or as God, Christ and the Spirit. And this is the realization of the Saviour's prayer;—"I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and didst love them even as thou lovedst me."²

¹ St. John vii. 39 in the Greek; *οὐκ ἦν Πνεῦμα, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔδοξέσθην.*

² Compare Moberly,— "Atonement and Personality," pp. 212-215, where this conception of the Holy Trinity is treated with profound spiritual insight. Compare also W. Sanday,— "Christologies, Ancient and Modern," pp. 149, 150;—" . . . By Christian mysticism I mean the union of the human spirit with the Spirit of Christ, who is also the Spirit of God. There is this specific character about Christian mysticism that it is not so vague and indeterminate as other forms, but that it starts from the full conception of Christ; the belief in the Spirit of Christ—i. e., in the exalted Christ as Spirit—never forgets its origin; there are blended with it the features of the historical

Not that in this 'spiritual' conception of the Trinity the metaphysical element, the element of reason and logic has altogether ceased: though not now immediately obvious, it is still implied. The Risen Christ has not ceased to be the Logos, the eternal Reason and Wisdom of God. The spiritual interpretation of the Trinity is in nowise inconsistent with those metaphysical interpretations which have been preserved for us in the dogma of the Church; on the contrary it implies them, even as the Gospel implies and includes the Law. It does not destroy, it fulfills; while presupposing the ancient dogma it transcends it. May we not adapt the words of St. Paul, first spoken in another connection, and say, — "Henceforth we know no truth after the flesh (i. e., in the light of mere human reason and understanding); yea, though we have known the Trinity after the flesh (i. e., as a 'scientific' conception), yet now know we (it so) no more." "And he that sitteth on the throne said, Behold, I make all things new." "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit; they are created, and thou renewest the face of the ground." In this universal renewal shall not the aspect of Christian theology be transformed? "The Lord (Christ) is the Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Orthodoxy, the dogma, is now recognized not so much as an authoritative law, imposed in purely external fashion upon the reason and understanding of the natural man, but is Christ, which impart to it a richness and power of human appeal, which other more abstract forms of mysticism do not possess."

realized as a message of faith's liberty in Christ and in His holy life. This does not mean that the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy is now no longer valid; for the dogma itself, rightly understood, rightly interpreted, is recognized as 'spiritual.' It is not that the new interpretation of the Trinity is 'anti-metaphysical' or merely 'ethical,' any more than that the Gospel is contrary to the Law. But the true orthodoxy means more than correct theological opinions; it is the expression of a life; it is a realization of faith working by love; it is a manifestation of "the law of the Spirit of the life which is in Christ Jesus."

APPENDIX I

THE TESTIMONY OF THE EASTERN CREEDS

THE following symbolic statements contain, in whole or in part, the characteristic phrases to which we referred as occurring in 1 Cor. viii. 4-6 and St. John i. 3.¹

(1) The conjectural form of the Eastern Baptismal Symbol; — "We believe in one God, Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."²

(2) Symbols of the Palestinian Churches.

(a) The Creed submitted to the Nicene Council by Eusebius of Cæsarea as being the historic and traditional Creed in use in the Church of Cæsarea, and which became the basis of the Nicene Symbol of A. D. 325; — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(b) The Creed of the Church at Jerusalem (circa A. D. 350), as found in St. Cyril; — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and

¹ The original texts may be found in Hahn's *Bibliothek der Symbole*, pp. 127-355.

² The word which we have rendered by the phrase 'came into existence' in this and the following Creeds is *ἐγένετο* (St. John i. 3).

in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

In the Creed given by Epiphanius, both in its shorter and in its longer form, the same phrases occur.

(3) Symbols of the Syrian Churches.

(a) The Creed found in the Apostolic Constitutions; — "I believe and am baptized into (*eis*) one . . . God, Almighty . . . (out) of whom (are) all things; and into (*eis*) the Lord Jesus, the Christ . . . through whom all things came into existence, those in heaven and on earth, both visible and invisible. . . ."¹

(b) Symbol of the Church in Antioch; — "Through (by) whom² all things came into existence."

(c) The (conjectural) Symbol of the Church at Laodicea (in Syria); — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom . . . all things came into existence."

(d) The Nestorian Baptismal Confession; — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(4) Symbols of the Churches of Asia Minor.

(a) Baptismal Symbol of Cappadocia, according to Auxentius of Milan; — ". . . per ipsum

¹ Col. i. 16.

² I. e., by the 'Son,' as the context shows.

(scilicet, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum)
 . . . omnia facta sunt."

(b) Baptismal Symbol of the Armenian Church (the longer form);—"We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(5) Ecumenical Symbols.

(a) The Nicene Symbol (A. D. 325);—"We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(b) The enlarged form of the 'Nicene' Creed;—"We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(c) Anathemas of the Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople (A. D. 553); Anathema I.—"For (there is) one God and Father, (out) of whom (are) all things, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (by) whom (are) all things, and one Holy Spirit, in whom (are) all things."

(6) Symbols of Particular Synods.

The Confession of Faith of an Antiochene Synod against Paul of Samosata quotes, among other Scriptural passages, St. John i. 3 in full. Compare also the first formula of the Second Antiochene Synod (A. D. 341).

(a) The second formula of the latter Confession, as given by St. Athanasius in his *Epistola*

de Synodis, contains the words;— “We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom (are) all things.”

(b) The third formula of the same Confession, as given by Theophronius, Bishop of Tyana (see St. Athan. de Synod. § 24), contains the words; — “I believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . (out) of whom (are) all things, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (by) whom (are) all things.”

(c) The fourth formula (see St. Athan. de Synodis, § 25; Socrates, Hist. Eccl. ii. 18; and Nicephorus, Hist. Eccl. ix. 10) reads; — “We believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . ‘(out) of whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named’; ¹ and in the Lord Jesus Christ, through (by) whom all things came into existence.”

(d) So also the formula of the Synod at Philipopolis (A. D. 343); — “Credimus in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem et factorem universorum, ex quo omnis paternitas in coelo et in terra nominatur; credimus et in . . . Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum . . . per quem facta sunt omnia.”

(e) Likewise the formula of the Third Synod of Antioch (A. D. 345), the *Ἐκθεσις μακρόστιχος*, given by St. Athanasius, de Synodis, § 26.

(f) Also the formula of the First Synod at Sirmium, A. D. 351.

¹ Ephes. iii. 15.

(g) The formula of the Fourth Synod of Sirmium (A. D. 359);— “We believe in one . . . God, Father Almighty . . . and in one only-begotten Son of God ‘through (by) whom the worlds (*oi alôwes*) were framed,’¹ and all things came into existence.”

(h) The formula put forth by the Synod of Nice in Thrace (A. D. 359);— “We believe in one . . . God, Father Almighty, (out) of whom (are) all things; and in the only-begotten Son of God . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence.”

(i) The Acacian formula set forth at the Synod of Seleucia in Isauria (A. D. 359) [see St. Athan. de Synodis § 29];— “And we acknowledge and believe in one God, Father Almighty . . . and we believe moreover in one Lord, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence.”

(j) The formula of the Synod at Constantinople (A. D. 360) [see St. Athan. de Synodis, § 30];— “We believe in one God, Father Almighty, (out) of whom (are) all things; and in the only-begotten Son of God . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence.”

(7) Private Confessions of Faith.

(a) The Creed of Lucian Martyr;²— “We be-

¹ Heb. xi. 3.

² The text of this Creed is given by Bp. Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicaenae*, vol. i., pp. 343, 344. (Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, Oxford, 1851.)

APPENDICES

lieve, agreeably to the evangelical and apostolical tradition, in one God, Father Almighty, Creator and Maker of all things; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, His Son, the Only-begotten, God, through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(b) The Confession of Arius (second formula); — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty; and in (the) Lord Jesus Christ, His Son (*καὶ εἰς Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν Ὑιὸν αὐτοῦ*) . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(c) Confession of Eunomius (circa A. D. 360); — "We believe in one God, Father Almighty, (out) of whom (are) all things; and in one only-begotten Son of God . . . our Lord, Jesus Christ, through (by) whom (are) all things."

(For the Confession of Faith of Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, see above, under Symbols of the Palestinian Churches.)

(d) Confession of St. Basil the Great; — "We believe and acknowledge one only true and good God Almighty and Father, (out) of whom (are) all things . . . and one His only-begotten Son, our Lord and God, Jesus Christ . . . through (by) whom all things came into existence."

(e) Confession of St. Damasus, Bishop of Rome, (*Confessio Fidei Catholicae*); — "Credimus in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem visibilium et invisibilium; et in unum Dominum, Jesum Christum, Filium Dei . . . per quem omnia facta sunt."

(f) Confession of Pelagius;—“Credimus in Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, cunctorum visibilibus et invisibilibus conditorem; credimus et in Dominum nostrum, Jesus Christum, per quem creata sunt omnia.”

(g) Confession of St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland (lived between 373 and 493 A. D.);—“Non est alius Deus, nec unquam fuit, nec erit post hunc, praeter Deum Patrem ingenitum, sive principio, a quo est omne principium, omnia tenens (ut diximus); et hujus Filius, Jesus Christus . . . et per ipsum (scil. Jesum Christum) facta sunt visibilia et invisibilia.”

We can scarcely fail to recognize in the Confession of St. Damasus, Bishop of Rome, as well as in those of Pelagius and St. Patrick, the clear evidence of Eastern affiliation; for in these Confessions, as in the Eastern Confessions generally, creation is ascribed to our Lord Jesus Christ as the efficient or instrumental Cause. The same connection may be seen in the Confession of Faith of Gregory, Bishop of Tours, and in the Exposition of the Creed given by Theodulph of Orleans.

APPENDIX II

TRINITARIAN TERMINOLOGY IN THE GREEK FATHERS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY

St. Athanasius

HARNACK's implied statement that St. Athanasius was not in the technical sense of the term a 'scientific' theologian¹ is not borne out, we are convinced, by a close study of St. Athanasius' theological writings. Athanasius uses theological terms with the same delicate discrimination as do St. Basil and the two Gregories. It must, indeed, be admitted that in the mind of St. Athanasius no clear or fixed distinction was drawn between 'essence' (*οὐσία*) and 'substance' (*ὑπόστασις*). But surely it is rash to conclude from this fact that Athanasius was no scientific theologian. In his Epistle to the African Bishops St. Athanasius expressly identifies the terms *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, affirming that they have the same meaning *ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ἔχει* (Ep. ad Afros. Epis. § 4). In this particular, however, St. Athanasius is in accord with the language of the Nicene Anathema of A. D. 325, in which these two terms are used as practically equivalent.² In his conciliatory letter written

¹ *Outlines of the History of Dogma*, pp. 248, 259-263.

² On the other hand, in the treatise *In Illud, Omnia*, § 6, Athanasius does not shrink from recognizing a distinction between these terms.

to the Church of Antioch after the Council of Alexandria, which had been held under his own presidency in A. D. 362, Athanasius says that the question of 'one Hypostasis' or 'three' ought not to be pressed; both expressions being susceptible of a pious meaning. Referring to the conclusion which had been reached at the recent Council, he says, — "And all, by God's grace, and after the above explanations, agree together that the faith confessed by the fathers at Nicæa is better than the said phrases, and that for the future they would rather be content with and would use its language" καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ τοῖς ταύτης ἀρκεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ χρᾶσθαι ῥήμασιν.¹ In this same letter to the Antiochenes, § 5, St. Athanasius apparently admits the expression 'distinct in essence' (ἁλλοτριούσιος) as applying both to other creatures and to those who are born of men, each one of whom, however, has, or rather is, an individual 'substance' (ὑπόστασις διηρημένη). On the other hand, to things heterogeneous among themselves, as gold, silver, brass, the expression 'of different essence' (διαφόρας οὐσίας) is applied. — "Ὡς οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται λέγουσιν (τὰς ὑποστάσεις) ἀπαλλοτριωμένας καὶ ἀπεξενωμένας, ἁλλοτριουσίους τε ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐκάστην καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν διηρημένην, ὥς ἔστι τὰ τε ἄλλα κτίσματα, καὶ οἱ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γεννώμενοι, ἢ ὥσπερ δὲ διαφόρας οὐσίας, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν χρυσός, ἢ ἄργυρος ἢ χαλκός.

¹ Newman's rendering, in this and other treatises, of *ὑπόστασις* by 'subsistence' is unfortunate; reading back, as it does, into earlier theological statements the distinctions and definitions of the Scholastic period.

With the above distinction St. Gregory of Nazianzus would apparently not agree; for he implies evidently and distinctly (Orat. XXXIX. § 12 sub fin.) that even in the case of Adam and of Seth, who were differently born, it would be absurd to say that their natures were 'other' in their mutual relation (*ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀλλοτριώσουσιν*). But this is for the reason that St. Gregory Nazianzen draws a clear distinction between (generic) 'essence' (*οὐσία*) or 'nature' (*φύσις*) and individual 'substance' (*ὑπόστασις*) which St. Athanasius does not. At the same time, it is evident from the quotation just given that St. Athanasius shrinks from pressing too far the analogy of the human filial relation to that relation in which the Divine Son stands to His Father; recognizing the fact that the union between the Eternal Son and His Father is far closer and more intimate than that which obtains in the case of the earthly analogue.

It is to be observed that in the above passage of St. Athanasius *ὑπόστασις* does not necessarily imply what we understand by 'personality,' inasmuch as 'the other creatures' as well as man possess *ὑπόστασις*; in fact, each individual thing possesses, or rather is, a distinct *ὑπόστασις*.¹

Athanasius guards against Sabellianism by insisting upon the distinction between *ἁποούσιος* and *μονούσιος*.²

¹ With this compare also St. Gregory of Nyssa, Great Catechism, chap. i — "for it is an impiety to suppose that the Word has a soulless 'hypostasis,' after the manner of stones."

² See page 35 above.

The statement of the Ecthesis, that brief but weighty Exposition of the faith of St. Athanasius, has already been quoted, but it may be repeated here. — “For neither do we hold a Son-Father, as do the Sabellians, calling Him” (as they do) “*μονοούσιον* (i. e., of the same numerical essence or substance) and not *ὁμοούσιον*, and thus destroying the existence of the Son” — *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀναιροῦντες τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ*. In connection with this should be taken St. Athanasius’ language in the (so-called) Fourth Oration against the Arians (chapter i) where God the Father is spoken of as the one Source or ἀρχή in the Godhead; as the self-existent Essence and Substance (*οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις*) from whom the Son, or Logos, proceeds, and from whom in consequence the Son is Himself possessed of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*; — *Ὡς γὰρ ἐκ Θεοῦ Θεός ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ Σοφοῦ Σοφία, καὶ ἐκ Λογικοῦ Λόγος, καὶ ἐκ Πατρὸς Υἱός· οὕτως ἐξ ὑποστάσεως ὑπόστατος, καὶ ἐξ οὐσίας οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνούσιος, καὶ ἐξ ὄντος ὢν*. The same meaning is expressed in the following passage:¹ — “But the Son, being Offspring from the Essence, in essence is one, Himself and the Father who begat Him” *ὁ δὲ Υἱός, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν γέννημα, οὐσίᾳ ἐν ἐστίν, αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γέννησας αὐτὸν Πατήρ*. St. Athanasius is willing to apply the term *ὁμοιος* (‘like’) to the Son, i. e., in a general sense, as in the Ecthesis, — “Whole from Whole, being like to the Father, as saith the Lord, ‘He who hath seen me hath seen the Father’” *ὅλος ἐξ ὅλου, ὁμοιος τῷ Πατρὶ ὢν, ὡς φησιν ὁ Κύριος, ὁ ἐμὲ ἑώρακώς. . .* But he objects to the use of this term, when taken in

¹ De Synodis, § 48, sub. fin.

its strict or proper significance, as indicative of the nature of the Son — “For you yourselves know, and no one will doubt, that the (term) ‘like’ is not predicated with reference to substances, but with reference to figures and qualities ; for with reference to substances not likeness but identity would be predicated” οἶδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς, καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν τις ἀμφιβάλλοι, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιότητων λέγεται ὅμοιον · ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ ὁμοιότης ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη.¹ ²

In view of the above passages, to which a multitude more might be added from the Orations against the Arians, the “De Synodis,” and other treatises, illustrating St. Athanasius’ careful and discriminating use of theological terms, it can hardly be maintained that St. Athanasius was not a ‘scientific’ theologian in the sense in which this term is applied to the ‘Cappadocian’ Fathers. We submit that it is a narrow and arbitrary use of the word ‘scientific’ in connection with the Nicene theology when its application is conditioned solely upon the recognition of a single distinction, even though the distinction be (as in this case) that between *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία*. If it is true, as it doubtless is, that the theological language of St. Athanasius is to be interpreted by the theological language of St. Basil and the two Gregories, it is none the less true, on the other hand, that their statements must

¹ De Synodis, § 53.

² St. Basil (Letter viii. 3) makes the same distinction between ‘the like’ and ‘the same’; ‘likeness’ referring to quality, and ‘identity’ referring to the essential nature.

be interpreted by reference to his. He is complementary to them, as they are complementary to him. There is no sound reason for conceding the title of 'scientific' theologian to St. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, and at the same time withholding that title from St. Athanasius.

St. Basil of Cæsarea

For the understanding of St. Basil's Trinitarian teaching a passage of critical importance is that in Letter lii. 3,¹ in which the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον* are used as equivalent, and the term *ὁμοούσιος* is definitively explained. "This term (*ὁμοούσιος*) also corrects the error of Sabellius, for it does away with the identity of the 'hypostasis,' and introduces in its perfection the conception of the 'persons.' For nothing is *ὁμοούσιον* with itself; but one thing (is so) with another. The word *ὁμοούσιος* has therefore an excellent and pious use; both defining (as it does) the propriety (*τὴν ιδιότητα*) of the 'hypostases,' and setting forth the unchangeableness (*τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον*) of the 'nature'" αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ καὶ τοῦ Σαβελλίου κακὸν ἀνόρθονται ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, καὶ εἰσάγει τελείαν τῶν προσώπων τὴν ἔννοιαν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτό τι ἔστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. ὥστε καλῶς ἔχει καὶ εὐσεβῶς, τῶν τε ὑποστάσεων τὴν ιδιότητα διορίζουσα, καὶ τῆς φύσεως τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον παριστώσα. Letter xxxviii., entitled "To his brother Gregory, concerning the difference between οὐσία

¹ Referred to above, p. 42, footnote 1.

and *ὑπόστασις*," is also very important in this connection.

St. Basil is willing to accept the phrase *ὁμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν* (like in essence) — if qualified by the adverb *ἀπαράλλακτως* (unchangeably) — as equivalent to *ὁμοούσιος* (Letter ix. 3).

In Letter ccxiv. (to Count Terentius) St. Basil explains the distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* as follows: — "If you ask me to state shortly my own view, I shall state that *οὐσία* has the same relation to *ὑπόστασις* as the common has to the particular.¹ Every one of us both shares in existence by the common term of 'essence' (*οὐσία*), and by his own properties is such an one and such an one. In the same manner, in the matter in question, the term *οὐσία* is common, like 'goodness,' or 'Godhead,' or any similar attribute; while 'hypostasis' is contemplated in the special propriety of Fatherhood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify."²

The concrete realism of St. Basil's view of the Holy Trinity (in contradistinction to that tendency to abstraction which we shall have occasion to remark in St. Gregory of Nazianzus) is evidenced by the fact that St. Basil (as in Epistle xxxviii. 4) speaks of the Father and the Son as 'Powers' (*δυνάμεις*). As we shall see, St. Gregory of Nyssa uses such expressions with even greater freedom.

¹ Cp. Ep. ccxxxvi. 6.

² The above translation is taken from the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers*, Series II, vol. viii, p. 254.

St. Gregory of Nyssa

The relation of St. Gregory of Nyssa¹ to his brother St. Basil was a particularly close one, not only 'according to the flesh' but in mind and spirit as well. Though speaking of Basil as his 'master,' Gregory was himself far from being a mere follower in the footsteps of others. His part in the development of the Trinitarian theology of the Greek Church was a very important one. As has already been said, St. Gregory speaks with even greater freedom than St. Basil of the Divine Hypostases as concrete, living 'Powers.' He represents Each of Them as being a personal Divine Agent, possessed not only of a distinct consciousness, but of a distinct, individual will, or power of choice. — "If, then, the Logos, as being Life, lives, it certainly has the faculty of choice, for no one of living creatures is without such a faculty" *εἰ οὖν ζῇ ὁ Λόγος, ὁ ζῶν ὢν, καὶ προαιρετικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει πάντως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπροαίρετον τῶν ζώντων ἐστὶ.*² The Divine Logos, moreover, "wills what is absolutely good and wise and" (possesses) "all else that connotes superiority." He is "other than He of whom He is the Word" *ὁ δὲ Λόγος οὗτος ἕτερός ἐστι παρὰ τὸν οὗ ἐστι Λόγος.* "For this, too" (i. e., the term 'Logos') "is, in a certain manner, a term of relation" *τρόπον γὰρ τινα τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν . . .* "for it would not be

¹ Our references to the original text of St. Gregory of Nyssa are made to the edition of Morell (Paris, 1638), the Arabic numerals indicating the pages.

² Catechesis Major, chap. i.

‘word’ were it not a word of some one” οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη λόγος, μή τινος ὦν λόγος.

In like manner, of the Divine Spirit,¹ — “But we conceive of It” (the Spirit of God) “as an essential Power, Itself regarded as by Itself in its individualizing ‘hypostasis’” δύναμιν οὐσιώδη, αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένην. The Holy Ghost is “incapable of being separated from God, in whom He is, or from the Word of God, whom He accompanies; neither is He being poured forth into non-substantiality (οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀναχεομένην) but after the likeness of God’s Word existing in respect to ‘hypostasis’ (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν οὖσαν) is able to will, self-moved, efficient, ever choosing the good, and for (His) every purpose having His power concurrent with His will”² προαιρετικὴν,

¹ Catechesis Major, chapter ii.

² The translations of passages from St. Gregory of Nyssa are taken, though with some modifications, from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers, Second Series, vol. v., except in the case of the treatise “De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostaseon.” One modification which is to be noted is as follows:—In our rendering of passages from St. Gregory of Nyssa which refer to the Holy Spirit, it will be observed that we have used first the neuter pronoun ‘It,’ and later the masculine pronoun ‘He.’ The reason for this lies in the fact that the usage of the two languages, the Greek and the English, in respect to the gender of nouns and pronouns, is so widely different. In English, the neuter gender generally conveys the idea of impersonality; *things* are conceived of as neuter, in distinction from *persons*, which are masculine or feminine. This is not necessarily the case in Greek. To the Greek ear, the masculine or feminine gender of a noun need not convey the idea of personality, i. e., of conscious, individual existence. And *e contra*, the neuter gender of a noun (or pronoun) does not necessarily exclude the idea of personality.

αὐτοκίνητον, ἐνεργόν, πάντοτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰρουμένην, καὶ πρὸς πάντα πρόθεσιν σὺνδρομον ἔχουσαν τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν.

St. Gregory deliberately accepts the apparent paradox that "That which is capable of being numbered yet rejects complete enumeration"; that "That which is observed with distinctions is yet apprehended as a Monad; and is distinguished in the 'hypostasis' and is not divided in the 'substance'" *πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀριθμητὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφεύγει τὴν ἐξαρίθμησην · καὶ διηρημένως ὁράται, καὶ ἐν μονάδι καταλαμβάνεται · καὶ διακέκριται τῇ ὑποστάσει, καὶ οὐ μεμέρισται*

That is to say,—the gender of nouns and pronouns is not in the Greek language determinative of personality, which, therefore, must be settled by other considerations, due weight being given in each particular case to the context. As a specific instance;—the Greek word *πνεῦμα* (spirit) is in the neuter gender. But we are not to conclude from this fact either that 'spirit' in general, or the Divine Spirit in particular, is in the New Testament conceived of in a merely impersonal sense. Such a conclusion would be not only unjustifiable on general principles; it would in this specific case be utterly erroneous; it would mean that we should have to do violence to the context in a large number of New Testament passages.

It is probable that what (as a general rule) really determines the meaning here is the use or non-use of the article.¹ The general usage in the New Testament appears to be that where *Πνεῦμα* is read with the article (*τὸ Πνεῦμα*) the Holy Spirit is indicated in His personal aspect; where, on the other hand, the article is omitted, what is meant to be expressed is the Spirit conceived as the Gift or Communication of Divine life, grace or virtue.

For a further discussion of this subject, Dr. Swete's recently published work, "The Holy Spirit in the New Testament" (Macmillan, 1910) may be consulted with advantage, especially Note P. in the Appendix, entitled "'Spirit' and 'The Spirit.'"

¹ Note also the use of the masculine pronoun *ἐκεῖνος* in St. John xv. 26; xvi. 8, 13, where our Lord is speaking of the Holy Spirit.

τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, *ibid.*, c. iii. While embracing the apparent contradiction that the same thing should be said to be both united and distinguished (μὴ θαυμάσης δὲ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συνημμένον καὶ διακεκρμένον εἶναι φαμεν) St. Gregory acknowledges that his interpretation is but a token and a shadow of the truth (ὑπόδειγμα καὶ σκιὰν ἀληθείας, οὐχ ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθειαν).¹ In illustration of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the figure of the rainbow is employed; ² its splendour being both continuous and discrete (αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ αὐγὴ καὶ συνεχὴς ἐστὶ παρ' ἑαυτὴν καὶ διήρηται); while the several colours are distinct, at the same time they melt into each other.³ In speaking of the passage Hebrews i. 3, St. Gregory says that the Son of God as the Image (εἰκὼν) is both the same with and is distinct from God the Father, who is the Prototype (εἰκὼν ταύτων τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ ἐστὶ· κἀν ἕτερον ᾗ).⁴

The distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις is clearly drawn in the treatise "De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostaseon," from which we have already quoted, but in regard to which there has been some difference of opinion as to whether its authorship should be attributed to St. Gregory or to his brother, St. Basil. 'Essence' (οὐσία) is the generic nature which is possessed in common by several individuals; 'hypostasis' is the concrete substance (whether person or thing) which is distinguished by individual properties or characteristics (ιδιώματα) from other 'hypostases' which

¹ De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostaseon, 33, b.

² As it is by St. Basil, Ep. xxxviii. 5.

³ De Diff. Essent. et Hyp. 34, a.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 37, b.

possess, or may possess, the same οὐσία. The following quotations will serve to make this clear;—(Παῦλος, Σιλουανός, Τιμόθεός) εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοούσιοι, οἱ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπογραφόμενοι . . . τοῦτο τοίνυν φαμέν, τὸ ἰδίως λεγόμενον τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως δηλοῦσθαι ῥήματι (29, b, c). Definite distinction (περιγραφῇ) in the usage of St. Gregory belongs to the 'hypostasis' or 'individual,' while the common 'essence' (οὐσία) is less clearly defined. While clear definition (περιγραφῇ) connoting, as it does, individual characteristics (ιδιώματα), pertains to the 'hypostasis,' the 'substance' (ὑπόστασις, the same word being used) of the common οὐσία is indeterminate or infinite (ἀόριστος) and undefined (ἀπερίγραπτος) (29, c, d). The individual thing (πρᾶγμα), in contrast with the common nature (φύσις), is τὸ ὑφεστῶς καὶ δηλούμενον ἰδίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα. In the individual (as in Paul or Timothy) we find ὑφεστῶσαν τὴν φύσιν (29, c). Gregory charges the Arians with introducing διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφοράν, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας περιγραφὴν (28, d).

St. Gregory's theology, as will be evident from the above statements, was peculiarly exposed to attack from the side of those who charged him with Tritheism. Perhaps the statement by which St. Gregory is most widely known is that found in his 'letter or short dissertation' to Ablabius, known by the title "Quod non sunt tres Dii" ("That there are not Three Gods"). The question with which Gregory is here dealing, and which he confesses to be one of no small difficulty, is that, whereas three human individuals (as Peter, James and John) are spoken of as

'three men,' it is, on the other hand, held to be unlawful to call the three Divine 'Hypostases' — the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost — 'three Gods.' Does it not, however, logically result from the Trinitarian doctrine as stated by St. Gregory that the Divine Three are in effect, and should therefore be acknowledged to be 'three Gods'? In grappling with this difficulty, St. Gregory speaks as follows; — "The term 'man' does not belong to the individuality, but to the community of the nature" οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑκάστων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως (17, c). (Compare the statement in St. Basil's Letter ccxiv., quoted above.) "According to the more accurate expression" (however), St. Gregory continues, "man would be said to be one ultimately, even though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality" οὕτω κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον λόγον, καὶ ἄνθρωπος εἰς κυρίως ἓν ῥηθείη, κἄν οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ δαικνύμενοι πλῆθος ὦσιν.

From all that has been said it is evident that St. Gregory of Nyssa practically interprets the Divine 'Hypostases' as concrete and individual, while regarding the 'essence' or the 'Godhead' as a generic and (relatively) indefinite and abstract conception.

St. Gregory of Nazianzus

In St. Gregory Nazianzen we recognize a theologian of commanding significance. "Called by the Council of Ephesus 'The Great,' he is universally known in the Greek Church as 'The Theologian' or 'The Di-

vine,' a title which he alone, among the Fathers of the Church, shares with St. John the Evangelist."¹ In his eloquent Orations the Nicene theology of the Trinity seems to reach its fullest efflorescence, while attaining its point of mature and balanced self-consciousness. The true Faith of the Church is seen as holding the middle way, recognizing the elements of positive truth, while rejecting the negative errors inherent in the Greek polytheistic philosophy on the one hand, and in Jewish unitarianism on the other. In his power of abstraction St. Gregory Nazianzen seems to be superior to the other great champions of Nicene orthodoxy. Laying aside for the nonce the terms 'substance' (ὕποστασις) and 'person' (πρόσωπον), he frequently employs numeral adjectives (in the neuter) to indicate the ineffable Distinctions in the Godhead.² By his conception of 'the Three' (τὰ τρία) as 'elements' or 'momenta' in the one Godhead (θεότης) St. Gregory approximates Augustinianism, with its strict construction of the term 'person.' Analogous to the method of the *Quicunque Vult* is St. Gregory's procedure in his 'Farewell' Oration (Orat. XLII. 15), where, having introduced 'the Three' as respectively 'Without Beginning,' 'Beginning' and 'That which is along

¹ Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers, Second Series, vol. vii., p. 187.

² This fact is left obscure in the translation (by Browne and Swallow) given in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Library of the Fathers. In the quotations which follow we therefore venture to offer a revised translation of certain important passages.

with the Beginning' (ἀναρχον καὶ ἀρχή καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς), he afterward applies to these transcendent Distinctions in the Godhead the Divine Names, Father, Son and Spirit. In the concluding sections of the Oration on the Holy Spirit (Orat. XXXI.) St. Gregory confesses that there is no earthly analogue to the transcendent Fact of the Holy Trinity. Here, too, St. Gregory's language approximates with remarkable closeness the statements of the *Quicumque Vult*. Section 14 is of especial significance. St. Gregory boldly compares 'the Three' (τὰ τρία) to 'three suns, which exist in reciprocal relation to each other' (ἡλίοις τρισὶν ἔχομένοις ἀλλήλων) while uniting in one blended light. Though such a mode of representation would seem to make 'the Three' practically equivalent to three Beings, yet St. Gregory is anxious to avoid anything like Tritheism. In the following acute and subtle statement he still endeavors to make the unity the fundamental principle, — "To us there is 'one God,' because one Divinity; and unto One Those which are from Him have their reference, albeit Three are believed in" ἡμῖν εἰς θεός, ὅτι μία θεότης, καὶ πρὸς ἓν τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ τρία πιστεύηται.

The following, it is hoped, is a fairly accurate rendering of this Section 14, — "But what is our common contention and argument with both parties" (i. e., with those who either deny the Godhead of the Son or who deny the Godhead both of the Son and of the Spirit)? "To us there is 'one God,' because one Divinity; and unto One Those which are from Him

have their reference, albeit Three are believed in. For it is not the case that One is more, the Other less, 'God'; nor is One before, the Other after;¹ neither are They severed in will, nor divided in power; neither is it possible to find Here any of the characteristics which belong to things divided; but undivided in Those divided (if one must speak concisely) is the Godhead ἀλλὰ ἀμέριστος ἐν μεμερισμένοις . . . ἡ θεότης. And as it were in the case of three suns existing in reciprocal relations with each other" (or, 'holding of one another,' ἐχομένοις ἀλλήλων), "there is one mingling of the light. When, therefore, we look unto the Godhead, and the First Cause, and the 'Monarchia' (or 'Sole Origin') One is that which is represented to our mind (ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φανταζόμενον). But when we look toward Those ('Elements,' 'momenta') in which (is) the Godhead, and Those from the First Cause timelessly Thence existing and with equal glory—Three are Those that are worshipped" ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ θεότης, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας ἀχρόνως ἐκεῖθεν ὄντα, καὶ ὁμοδόξως, τρία τὰ προσκυνόμενα.²

¹ Compare the language of the *Quicumque Vult*,—"Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus."

² Note in this marvelously constructed sentence how St. Gregory endeavors to guard against any seeming inequality of rank in the representation of the Three Divine Distinctions. Having spoken of One of Them as 'the First Cause' (*αἰτία*, a noun of feminine gender), and having represented the other Two by the neuter (τὰ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας), St. Gregory then introduces the adverb ἐκεῖθεν (from 'Thence') at once to indicate the Origin as being the Father, and to equalize the mode of representing the ineffable 'Three.' Compare also St. Gregory's language in Orat. XXX, 20.

St. Gregory Nazianzen does not, however, always forbear to use the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον*. It is instructive to observe how he employs them in such a passage as sections 11 and 12 of the Oration on the Holy Lights (Oration XXXIX),¹ — “And when I speak of God, be illumined by one flash of light, and by three! Three indeed, according to the ‘Properties’ (*ιδιότητας*, individual characteristics), whether one wishes to call (Them) ‘Hypostases’ or ‘Persons’ *εἰτ’ οὖν ὑποστάσεις*, *εἴ τιμι φῶλον καλεῖν*, *εἴτε πρόσωπα*, for we shall not quarrel about the names so long as the syllables bear the same meaning; but one according to the definition of the Substance, or indeed of the Godhead *ἐνὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον*, *εἰτ’ οὖν, θεότητος*. For They are divided without division, if I may so say, and they are united in division. For One in Three (is) the Godhead, and the ‘Three’ are One, — the (‘Three’) in which the Godhead (is), or, to speak more accurately, which the Godhead (is) *ἐν γὰρ ἐν τρισὶν ἡ θεότης*, *καὶ τὰ τρία ἐν*, *τὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ θεότης*, *ἡ τό γε ἀκριβέστερον εἰπεῖν*, *ἃ ἡ θεότης*.²”

¹ We follow, with certain corrections, the translation given by Browne and Swallow.

² In the above passage Browne and Swallow mistranslate *ιδιότης* (= property, individual characteristic), first by ‘individuality,’ and then by ‘personality.’ In illustration of St. Gregory Nazianzen’s use of the term *ιδιότης*, see Oratio. XX, 6, sub fine, and 7.

³ Note here how closely St. Gregory’s language approximates to that of St. Augustine . . . “Trinitatem, qui est unus Deus” (De Trinit. XII, 7, sub fin.), and yet observe the subtle distinction. In the sentence of St. Gregory ‘the Godhead’ is the subject, and ‘the Three’ (*τὰ τρία*) is the predicate; in St. Augustine’s sentence ‘qui’ (the masculine singular of the relative pronoun, referring to the feminine antecedent ‘Trinitas,’ but by attraction agreeing in gender with

But to us (there is) one God, the Father (out) of whom (are) all things, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (by) whom (are) all things, and one Holy Ghost, in whom (are) all things; while the (expressions) 'of whom' and 'through whom', and 'in whom' do not make a division of natures, — τοῦ ἐξ οὗ, καὶ δι' οὗ, καὶ ἐν ᾧ, μὴ φύσεις τεμνόντων, — for in that case the prepositions or the order of the Names would never be changed, — but serve to distinguish the individual Characteristics of a Nature which is one and unconfused, ἀλλὰ χαρακτηριζόντων μιᾷ καὶ ἀσυγχύτου φύσεως ιδιότητας. And this is evident from the terms by which They are again gathered together into one, καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐξ ὧν εἰς ἓν συνάγονται πάλιν, if one reads, not carelessly, that passage in the same Apostle, — 'Of him, and through him, and for Him (are) all things; to him (be) the glory forever: Amen.'"¹ St. Gregory goes on to explain that it is the peculiar character of the Father to be unoriginate; of the Son to be from the Father by generation; and of the Spirit to proceed from the Father, yet not in the same manner as does the Son: — "There is, then, 'one God' in 'three' and 'the

'unus Deus' is the subject, and 'the One God' (unus Deus) is the predicate. St. Gregory, on the whole, after all makes 'the Three' concrete; the *unity* meanwhile tending to become abstract *θεότης*. In the thought of St. Augustine, on the other hand, 'the Three' has become a 'triplicity' (Trinitas); almost as though it were an abstract quality or formal distinction; while 'the one God' is the concrete individual Being. This point is dwelt upon more at large in what is said, both in the body of this Tractate and in Appendix III., concerning the Trinitarian teaching of St. Augustine.

¹ Rom. xi. 36.

Three' are one" . . . εἰς οὖν θεὸς ἐν τρισί, καὶ τὰ τρία ἓν. . . .

In Oration XX. 6 (sub fin.) the terms ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον and ιδιότης occur: ἐπεὶ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τὸν ἕνα θεὸν τηρεῖν, καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογεῖν, εἴτ' οὖν τρία πρόσωπα, καὶ ἐκάστην μετὰ τῆς ιδιότητος. In the following section the expression αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις occurs and the ιδιότητες of the Father and of the Son are set forth. Although "both Son and Spirit are 'carried up' into one Cause (i. e., the Father) εἰς ἓν αἷτιον καὶ Ὑιοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος ἀναφερομένων, yet they are not associated with the Father as by mechanical and external addition; nor yet are the Divine Hypostases obliterated, or dissolved, or confused into one, οὐ συντιθεμένων (Ὑιοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος) οὐδὲ συναλειφομένων . . . and that lest the 'all' be destroyed by those through whom the unity is revered more than is meet" αἱ δὲ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις (τηροῦντο) μηδεμῶς ἐπινουμένης συναλοιφῆς ἢ ἀναλύσεως ἢ συγχύσεως, ἵνα μὴ τὸ πᾶν καταλυθῇ δι' ὃν τὸ ἐν σεμνύνεται πλέον ἢ καλῶς ἔχει. "With respect to the unity and sameness of the Godhead, if I may so call it, both movement and purpose, and the identity of the 'Essence' are preserved" καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦτό τῆς θεότητος, ἵνα οὕτως ὀνομάσω, κινήματα καὶ βούλημα καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ταυτότητα. Here, be it noted, one purpose (βούλημα) is predicated of the three Divine Persons (compare Orat. XXIX. 2); while St. Gregory of Nyssa, on the other hand (as we have seen), indicates both for the Logos and for the Spirit of God a distinct βούλησις or faculty of willing.¹

¹ See above, pp. 69-71.

Finally, in regard to the meaning of *ὁμοούσιος* St. Gregory Nazianzen is quite in accord with St. Basil, as is evidenced in his Oration on the Holy Spirit (Orat. XXXI., from which we have already quoted), particularly in sections 15–20. In section 20 *ὁμοούσιος* is used as the opposite of ‘heterogeneous’ which implies that *ὁμοούσιος* is analogous to ‘homogeneous.’

APPENDIX III

ST. AUGUSTINE'S TRINITARIAN TEACHING

ST. AUGUSTINE'S great treatise "On the Trinity" is full of such statements as that "the Trinity itself (*ipsa Trinitas*) is the one true 'God'"; thus dissociating the Name of 'God' from any special reference to one or another Divine 'Person' taken singly. This Trinity, as '*unus Deus*,' is the Creator, Lord and Principle of all things. The following passages indicate a thought to which Augustine continually recurs.

(1) "*Satis est Christiano rerum creatarum causam . . . non nisi bonitatem esse creatoris, qui est Deus unus et verus ; nullamque esse naturam, quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso : eumque esse Trinitatem, Patrem scilicet, et Filium a Patre genitum, et Spiritum Sanctum ab eodem Patre procedentem, sed unum eumdemque Spiritum Patris et Filii. Ab hac summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia. . .*" *Enchiridion*, cc. 9, 10.

(2) "*Quod vero ad se dicuntur singuli, non dici pluraliter tres, sed unam ipsam Trinitatem ; sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus ; et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus ; et omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus ; nec tamen tres dii, aut tres boni, aut tres omnipotentes ; sed unus Deus bonus, omnipotens, ipsa*

Trinitas; et quidquid aliud non ad invicem relative, sed ad se singuli dicuntur." De Trin. VIII. 1 (cp. also V. 9.) With both of these passages the statements of the *Quicumque Vult* are closely parallel.

(3) "Ita cum audimus 'Fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei' (Gen. i. 27), quamvis posset usitatius dici, ad imaginem 'suam,' non tamen cogimur aliam personam intelligere in Trinitate, sed ipsam unam eandemque Trinitatem, qui est unus Deus, et ad cuius imaginem factus est homo." De Trin. XII. 7, sub fin.

In the last passage it will be observed that St. Augustine indirectly admits the personal unity of God (Trinitatem, qui est unus Deus).¹ Newman speaks somewhere of the 'unitarianism' of St. Augustine. Statements similar to the above might be multiplied from the treatise "De Trinitate."

We cannot here enter upon St. Augustine's effort to interpret the Triune existence of God by analogies drawn from psychology, save to point out the highly significant fact that Augustine's employment of this method bears witness to his conception of the God-head as being that of an individual Unity in which Unity a three-fold Distinction nevertheless exists. — "Trinitatis imago fiebat in homine, ut hoc modo esset homo imago unius veri Dei, quia ipsa Trinitas unus verus Deus est." (De Trin. XII. 7.) For the unity of the soul is personal; its several faculties or functions are relatively abstract 'differentia.' In Book VIII. 14 St. Augustine cites 'love' as an illustration of unity

¹ This passage has been referred to above, p. 78, foot-note 3.

in triplicity ;— “ Amor autem alicujus amantis est et amore aliquid amatur. Ecce tria sunt ; amans et quod amatur et amor.” The analogy which is developed in Book IX. is that of the mind with its self-knowledge and its self-love. In Book X. the analogy developed is that of ‘memory, understanding, will.’ The above lines of thought, it is scarcely necessary to say, have borne abundant fruit in the theology of the Schoolmen, and have furnished material for the speculation of modern philosophers and theologians.

It is rather remarkable that such recent historians of dogma as Harnack and ~~Geeberg~~ quite fail to indicate the important contribution made by St. Augustine to the doctrinal form of Western Trinitarianism. May this not be owing to the fact that we are still living in the atmosphere of Augustinian Trinitarianism, and that one is apt to fail to take note of what is most intimately present with himself or within his own immediate consciousness? Probably it would not be correct to say that either St. Augustine or the framer of the *Quicumque Vult* consciously undertook to develop what was implied in the ancient Hebrew Divine Name, ‘Jehovah’ (or as it is now written by Biblical scholars, ‘Jahveh’). St. Augustine was not a Hebrew scholar ; scarcely any of the Fathers of the Church were. Origen in the East and Jerome in the West are, of course, shining exceptions. But there is no doubt that the expression ‘unus Deus’ conveyed to the minds of St. Augustine and his contemporaries the thought of independent and absolute Being ;— “ Et haec Trinitas

unus Deus ; solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens : ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia." De Trin. V. 12, sub fin.

It will be evident from the above passages that the Divine unity which St. Augustine has in mind is the unity of a conscious, intelligent and free Individual. It is true that in indicating this unity St. Augustine avoids the use of the term 'persona,' but that is because this term had been appropriated to set forth the three-fold Distinction in the Divine Unity. Nevertheless, in the usage of St. Augustine and of the *Quicumque Vult*, 'unus Deus' indicates something more than abstract 'deitas' ; it sets forth the Being of Him whose Name is One ; — "solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens ; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia." So also in the *Quicumque Vult* ; — "Fides autem catholica haec est ; ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur."

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